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I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is the world's fourth largest country and "is the pivotal state in

Asia."' Until mid-1997, Indonesia was viewed as a "leading economic success
story' 2 and enjoyed the world's confidence in its overall stability.3 Specifically, the
country's real gross domestic product growth exceeded that of the United States and
averaged over seven percent from 1987 to 1997.! This, in turn, encouraged foreign
investment and the extension of credit to Indonesian companies.- Another factor

1.
Andrew MacIntyre, I'm Shocke4 Shocked, to FindThat Cryism Is Goingon in EastAsia; We May Rue
the Day the U.S. and the IMFSaved Suharto,LA. TIMES, Jan. 18,1990, at MI,available in LEXIS, News Ubrary,
Lat File; see also 1997-98 In Indonesia:Deep CrisisShocks Indonesians and Obscures Underlying Strengths In
Economy, 20 No. 3 E. Asian Executive Rep. 9 (1998) [hereinafter 1997.98 In Indonesia] (claiming Indonesia is
the anchor of Southeast Asia); see also Indonesia:Economic Trends and Outlook, 1998, INT'L MARET INSIGHT
REP., Aug. 13,1998, availablein WL 13711597 [hereinafter Economic Trends and Outlook] (asserting Indonesia
is central to Southeast Asia).
Economic Trends and Outlook supra note 1; see also 1997-98 in Indonesia, supranote I (discussing
2.
the decade of economic growth the country has enjoyed); see also Country: Indonesia, KALEIDOSCOPE (1998)
(asserting the IMF listed Indonesia seventh among the top ten emerging economies in 1996); c Thomas Krider,
Comment, Taking AnotherLook at the Regulation of Mutual Funds in the Aftermath of the Asian FinancialCrisis,
7 PAc.RIM L. POL'Y427, 429 (1998) (stating "Asian economic expansion had been lauded throughout the 1990s
as the blueprint for the economic salvation of developing nations").
3.
See generally 1997-98 in Indonesia,supra note I (attributing foreign investment as one of the factors
contributing to the country's economic growth). Foreign investment would not have occurred without confidence
in the country's economic stability. Id.
4.
See EconomicTrendsand Outlook,supranote I (discussing other strengths of the Indonesian economy
prior to the Asian financial crisis' impact).
5. See R. Carter Pate & Denise C. Andrews, The IMF Rescue: Asian Economies Propose Turnaround
Plansto Obtain Financing,17-NOV AMER. BANKR. INsT.J.20, 20 (1998) (stating that "[i]n 1996, nearly half of
the total foreign capital invested in developing countries went to Asia"); see also 1997-98 in Indonesia, supranote
1 (reasoning foreign investment was a contributing factor to the economic growth in Indonesia); see alsoEconomic
Trends and Outlook, supra note 1 (claiming the long-term economic growth encouraged foreign investment).
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contributing to Indonesia's growth and overall stability was the country's political
soundness, 6 in that President Suharto had led the country since 1965.'

However, in 1997, the Asian financial crisis commenced and, to date, has
terminated this lengthy period of prosperity for Indonesia.8 Although much
speculation still exists as to whether the country will ever completely recuperate,

no such restoration is currently within sight.9

In attempting to return to a period of economic prosperity, Indonesia has been
forced to vary from the status quo and face a new society. In doing so, Indonesia
has not taken a passive approach, but has swallowed its pride and accepted help and
instituted changes ranging from political to economic reformation.1° These changes
were largely in exchange for the monetary support provided primarily by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Specifically, this Comment examines Indonesia's enactment of three
regulations: (1) The amendments to the bankruptcy law, popularly referred to as
"the new bankruptcy law; 1 2 (2) The Jakarta Initiative; 13 and (3) INDRA.' 4 These

laws were enacted in reaction to the widespread-insolvency throughout the private
sector of the Indonesian economy resulting from the aftermath of the Asian

6.
See infra note 256 (explaining that the literature on this subject suggests a direct relationship exists
between the political stability of a country and its economic prosperity).
7.
See Nayan Chanda, Surges of Depression:Doom and Gloom have CharacterizedMost of the Region's
Economies Throughoutthe Year; And Though Some Profess to See Signs of Recovery, Most OthersFearthatthe
Tidal Wave Created by Asia's Crisis Will Continue to Wreck Economies, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 31, 1998
(outlining the events which led to the resignation of President Suharto). In 1998, President Suharto was reelected
to his seventh five-year term. In April, 1998, an Indonesian political movement, known as the "reformasi," began
picking up speed when students demonstrated and demanded economic and political reform in the nations capital,
Jakarta. Despite President Suharto's vow to repress protests, student rioting continued and grew into other major
cities. Id. In May, 1998, student riots escalated and resulted in the death of six students who were shot by police.
Id. This event increased the reformasi movement from student-led protests to a popular uprising. Id. Eventually,
President Suharto was forced to resign.
8.
See 1997-98 in Indonesia, supranote I (reviewing Indonesia's economy preceding the Asian financial
crisis and delineating the impact of the crisis); see also Economic Trends and Outlook, supra note I (exploring the
weaknesses of the Indonesian economy in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis).
9.
See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text (asserting many political and economic weaknesses still
exist and require reformation before economic stability will be restored).
10. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the IMF in Indonesia's attempt
to restore its economy).
11. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text (examining the terms of the agreement in exchange for

the money loaned).
12. See infra notes 106, 110-12, 117-20 and accompanying text (addressing the implementation of a
reformed bankruptcy law in exchange for monetary support). The amendments were enacted in August 1998, as
part of package of reforms promised in exchange for money loaned by the IMF. Id. The amendment is referred to
as the new bankruptcy law because, despite the literal existence of a bankruptcy law, this law was not employed.
See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (exploring the deficiencies of the original law). It was hoped that the
new amendment will change this and create a utilized bankruptcy law. See infra notes 126-54 and accompanying
text (examining the amendments to the bankruptcy law).
13. See infranotes 155-98 and accompanying text (reviewing the provisions of the Jakarta Initiative).
14. See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (describing the purpose and terms of INDRA the
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Program).
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financial crises 5 and are part of a plan to regain economic stability. This Comment
begins by outlining the original Indonesian insolvency law, which will serve as a

source of comparison for the new laws. 16 This Comment then briefly summarizes
the initiation of the Asian financial crisis and how it led to the deterioration of the
Indonesian economy.17 Due to the large role the IMF played in the regulatory
changes inaugurated in Indonesia, the bailout package conceived on behalf of the
Country is also examined.a8 With the foregoing background established, this
comment then delineates the provisions of the three regulations central to the future
handling of debtor and creditor relationships.1 9 Finally, this Comment analyzes the
implementation and effectiveness of these various regulations.'
II. HISTORY
In order to appreciate the significance of the enactment of the three regulations,
it is essential to understand the original insolvency law,2' how and why the need for
reformation arose,' and the role of the IM. 23
A.

The OriginalInsolvency Law

Prior to the enactment of new bankruptcy legislation in August 1998, only one
insolvency law had been enacted, and it had been amended only once. This law, the
Indonesian Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1906 and duplicated the Dutch
15. See infra notes 106, 110-12, 117-20 and accompanying text (detailing the context in which the
amendments to the bankruptcy law were enacted); see also David A. Sanger, Decisions by U.S. and IM.F.
WorsenedAsia'sProblems,The WorldBank Finds,N.Y. TlMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at A20 (stating estimated bankruptcy
levels in Indonesia are at seventy-five percent); see also World Bank Takes Dim View of the IMF Measures,STAR
TRiu., Dec. 3, 1998, at ID (quoting the World Bank's chief economist as stating that a country cannot perform with
seventy-five percent of its businesses bankrupt).
16. See infra notes 24-71 and accompanying text (examining the 1906 Bankruptcy Act).
17. See infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (setting forth the initiation of the Asian financial crisis and
its effect on Indonesia).
18. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text (considering the role of the IMF and the monetary support
it gave to Indonesia).
19. See infra notes 123-207 and accompanying text (reviewing the purposes and provisions of each of the
three regulations enacted to cope with the wide-spread insolvency throughout Indonesia).
20. See infra notes 208-56 and accompanying text (exposing the strengths and weaknesses of the three

regulations).
21. See infra notes 24-71 and accompanying text (delineating the terms of the 1906 insolvency law).
22. See infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (outlining the events that resulted in wide-spread
insolvency throughout Indonesia).
23. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the IMF and the agreement given
in exchange for monetary support).
24. See THoMAS H. REYNOLDS & ARTURo A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CuRRENr SOURCES OF CODES &
LEGISLATION INJURISDICTIONS OFTHE WORLD, INDONESIA, 111-13, at 13 (1994) (stating the bankruptcy law was
originally enacted in 1905 and subsequently amended in 1906). The Dutch Bankruptcy Act is popularly cited as
being enacted in 1906, omitting the original 1905 version. Id; see, e.g., Emalia Achmadi & Jaap J. Trommel,
Indonesia's Sound Law and Broken Courts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at 6; Robert N. Hornick, Indonesian
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Bankruptcy Act.7- Both laws 26 have as their purported purpose to advance the

financial interest of creditors. 27 Therefore, the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code weighs

heavily in favor of creditors' and did not provide debtors with a fresh start. 29
In staying with its pro-creditor tradition, the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code

provides for a wide variety of creditor remedies: (1) Chapter One establishes an
asset distribution framework that maximizes the amount apportioned out to

creditors; 3° (2) Chapter Two allows for a moratorium procedure; 31 (3) The Code
grants a wide latitude of power to the court-appointed receiver to generate as much
profit as possible on behalf of the insolvent company; 2 and (4) Indonesia's
Company Law provides for directors to be held personally liable for debts if the

BankruptcyLaw Protects Creditors,17 INT'L FIN. REv. 24,24 (1998) (stating the insolvency law was enacted in
1906 without making any reference to the 1905 version).
25. See Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (adding that the numerous Dutch am-andments have barely
altered the Act and that it is regarded as one of the finest examples of Dutch legislation). The Dutch bankruptcy
legislation was enacted in 1896. See id.; but see Homick, supranote 24 (commenting the Dutch bankruptcy Act
was enacted in 1893). Discrepancies exist as to when exactly the Dutch Bankruptcy Act was enacted, although the
general consensus appears to be 1896. In the middle of the 16th Century, the Dutch defeated the English military
and subsequently established the 13,500 islands of Indonesia under Dutch rule. See REYNOLDS & FLORES, supra
note 24, at 1Ii1-5 (stating as a consequence, the vast majority of Indonesian law either replicates or is heavily
influenced by Dutch law).
26. Because the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code duplicates the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, it can be deduced that
the commentary describing the Indonesian law is equally applicable to the Dutch law.
27. See Homick, supranote 24, at 24 (distinguishing bankruptcy laws which favor the debtor's interest by
providing a fresh start); see also Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (acknowledging the Indonesian bankruptcy
law advances the interests of the creditors).
28. See Achmadi & Trommel, supranote 24 (citing Philip Wood, PrinciplesofinternationalInsolvency,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995); see also Homick, supranote 24, at 24 (illustrating the "pro-creditor" nature of the law
by examining the individual provisions of the 1906 bankruptcy law).
29. See Homick, supra note 24, at 24 (warning the only material affect of this is that individual debtors
continue to be liable for the entirety of their debts after the discharge of the bankruptcy). In comparison to the U.S.'
bankruptcy laws, the purpose of bankruptcy is to provide the debtor with a clean slate free of debt, regardless if the
liquidation of the debtor's estate is unsuccessful in satisfying all of the debtors' then existing debts. See Martin N.
Flics & Michael J.Ireland, Bankruptcy and the Problemsof Multi-JurisdictionalWorkouts, 592 PRACTICING L.
INSIT. 415, 424; see also In re Hollanger, 15 Bankr. 35, 48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981) (describing an "express
Congressional policy in favor of rehabilitating debtors and maintaining the equity in their property").
30. See Achmadi & Trommel, supranote 24 (examining the bankruptcy law and its respective provisions);
see also Homick, supra note 24, at 25 (explaining general creditors receive pro rata apportionment of their claim
from the liquidation of the debtor's estate after secured creditors are paid in full).
31. See Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (referring to this pro-creditor term as the "suspension of
payments proceeding"). Such a provision is pro-creditor because it provides the creditor with the alternative of
postponing receipt of payment, versus a complete discharge of the debt. This is significant in comparison to the
system employed in the United States, which provides the debtor with a fresh start. See Achmadi & Trommel, supra
note 24 (highlighting the different results procured under bankruptcy under the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code
and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); see also Homick, supra note 24, at 26 (explaining moratorium is actually an
altemative to bankruptcy by suspending the payment of debts owed to general creditors). A petition for moratorium
may be filed by either the debtor or any of the debtor's creditors, at which point the court will appoint a receiver
to manage the debtor's business throughout the moratorium. Id However, the moratorium holds little value to the
debtor because it can only be used against general creditors, and not secured or preferred creditors. Ld.
32. See Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (maintaining the receiver generates profit by assuming
management of and running the business).
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33
directors' mismanagement of the company resulted in the bankruptcy.
Significantly, the Indonesian Bankruptcy Act does not result in a discharge of the
debtor's debts, 34 but rather preserves the debtor's liability to creditors even after the

adjudication. 35 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act respects preferences obtained prior
to the insolvency.'
Under the Indonesian Bankruptcy Act, any natural or juridical37 person is
eligible for bankruptcy if domiciled within the country.38 If a debtor defaults on his
debts, bankruptcy may be sought by the debtor, the debtor's creditors, or, if it is in

33. See ki. (adding that shareholders are not liable for the debts of a debtor-company); see also Homick,
supra note 24, at 26 (emphasizing the presumption is that directors are jointly and severally liable for losses
resulting from the directors' fault or negligence and avoidance of such liability requires proof to the contrary).
Beyond the potential for personal financial liability, directors may also be susceptible to imprisonment for up to
sixteen months if the director engaged in: 1) assisting or authorizing the commission of acts in violation of the
company's articles of incorporation, where all or part of a financial loss by the debtor resulted from these acts; or
2) assisting in or authorizing the procurement of a loan under "onerous" conditions with the intention of avoiding
bankruptcy and knowing his actions will not avoid bankruptcy; or 3) failure to keep adequate books and records
according to article six of the Commercial Code. I. Furthermore, a director of a debtor deemed bankrupt can serve
up to seven years of prison if, with the intent to defraud creditors, he engages in: 1) recording non-existent expenses
on the debtor's books or failed to record profits or deleted assets of the debtor, or 2) transferring an asset of the
debtor for less than its market value or without receiving value for it; or 3) preferring a creditor over other creditors
while knowing that bankruptcy cannot be avoided; or 4) failing to conform to proper bookkeeping standards as
established by the Commercial Code. Id.
34. See Hornick, supra note 24, at 24 (specifying a bankruptcy judgement creates a lien terminating the
debtor's power over the debtor's property and the effect of bankruptcy, with the exception of secured creditors, Is
the moratorium of creditor's claims). Conversely, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for a complete discharge of
the debtor's obligation to pay debts pursuant to a Chapter 7 proceeding. See Flics & Ireland supra 29. In this
situation, a trustee is charged with the duty of gathering all of the debtors assets, liquidating them, and satisfying
the greatest proportion of debt as possible. Id. Under this system, creditors are paid in order of priority and pursuant
to a pro rata apportionment. Id. Under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor's obligation to make payments to creditors
is suspended while the debtor and creditors work to formulate a reorganization plan, which may allow for the debtor
to pay back debts over a number of years. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 29, at 426.
35. See Horick, supra note 24, at 24 (explaining the status of a debtors liability upon an adjudication of
bankrupt); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (comparing the Indonesian bankruptcy law's preservation
of debt to the United States' policy of providing the debtor with a fresh start).
36. See Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (showing this is consistent with the insolvency law's general
respect of all accrued rights). This is significant when compared with the United State's bankruptcy law, which
gives the bankruptcy court the authority to void preferences. See infra note 151 (discussing the United
States'-bankruptcy courts' authority to preserve creditors' rights and interests). Compare this with the 1998
amendments, which give the commercial court the authority to void preferences. See infra note 152 and
accompanying text (asserting the commercial court's authority to void transactions that are detrimental to the
creditors).
37. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 853 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "juridical" as "in conformity with the laws of
the country and the practice which there observed"). Presumably, the phrase "juridical person" was used to convey
the concept that any person or entity, as prescribed by the laws of Indonesia, may seek bankruptcy within the
country.
38. See Homick, supra note 24, at 24 (explaining who qualifies as an eligible debtor under the 1906
bankruptcy law).
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the public's interest to do so, the public prosecutor.39 The petition for bankruptcy
is filed in the district court that has jurisdiction over the debtor's place of domicile,
and the rules of evidence do not apply.' Upon the filing of the petition for
bankruptcy, the court must immediately adjudge the debtor's status and deem the
debtor bankrupt if past due debts exist.4 1 The effect of a debtor being adjudicated
bankrupt is that a lien is placed over the debtor's property.42 In the event of a
judgement of bankruptcy, the debtor has-he opportunity to appeal within fourteen
days or eight days, depending on whether the debtor had prior notice of the
proceeding.43 However, such an appeal does not stay the bankruptcy."

After declaring a debtor bankrupt, the judge has fourteen days to establish a
deadline for all creditors to submit their claims to the court and to determine the
time and place for a gathering of the judge, receiver, debtor, and any creditors who
desire to attend.45 This meeting is called a verification meeting, and its purpose is
to review all of the claims filed by creditors and determine which are secured,

39. See id. (highlighting a reasonable interpretation of the Act in light of its duplication of the Dutch
bankruptcy law is the requirement of the debtor defaulting on at least two creditors). This interpretation is verified
under the 1998 amendments. See infra notes 126-54 and accompanying text (discussing the 1998 amendments to
the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
40. See Homick, supra note 24, at 24 (reviewing the procedure of the adjudication of a bankruptcy under
the Indonesian 1906 Bankruptcy Code).
41. See d. (warning a debtor need not be delinquent on all accounts and it is irrelevant why the debtor is
in default). The reality under the original insolvency law was that the judiciary did not adjudicate the debtor's status
quickly. See R1 'Lacks Experts for New Bankruptcy Law,' JAKARTA PosT, Aug. 6, 1998 (comparing the 1998
amendments to the 1906 bankruptcy law, "which allowed debtors to delay cases almost indefinitely); see generally
Indonesia Bankruptcy Law-2: Avoid Bentoel Scenarios, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, July 31, 1998 (highlighting
an instance in which the creditors of a bankrupt Indonesian company waited six years for an adjudication and was
finally settled). Consequently, the amendments to the law specifically require that the adjudication transpire within
thirty days of the filing of the petition, with an additional thirty day allowance for appeal. See infra notes 139-54
and accompanying text (examining the 1998 amendments to the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
42. See Hornick, supra note 24, at 24 (explaining the effect of an adjudication of bankrupt in the case of a
general creditor). In the event the judicially-determined bankrupt debtorhas secured creditors, the secured creditors'
claims are preserved despite the bankrupt adjudication. 1d.; see also Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (adding
that pursuant to an adjudication of bankruptcy, a company-debtor loses the right to use its assets for its benefit or
to engage in any other legal act).
43. See Hornick, supra note 24, at 24 (explaining the procedure through which a bankruptcy was carried
out under the 1906 law).
44. See id. (providing adiscussion ofthe appeal process following an adjudication ofbankrupt and the effect
of such an appeal).
45. See id. at 25 (specifying the verification meeting may not transpire until fourteen days after the deadline
for filing creditors' claims); see also Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (clarifying submission for verification
is a prerequisite for payment if the creditor is a general creditor).
46. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1355 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "Secured claims" as claims that are
guaranteed to be paid as a result of a security interest the creditor holds, such as a lien or other financial collateral).
Id. Such claims are only guaranteed to be paid up to the value of the security interest held by the creditor.
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preferred,4 7 or general, 8 and whether or not any filed claims are being disputed.49

At the meeting, the receiver may demand proof to substantiate a creditor's claim
and negotiate with creditors while the creditors may dispute the validity of a claim
or its amount. 5
Once a debtor is determined to be bankrupt, creditors with a secured interest
may foreclose on the secured property if this action is initiated within sixty days.
Alternatively, a secured creditor may redeem his financial interest through the
of the debtor's estate, as initiated by the court-appointed bankruptcy
liquidation
52
receiver.
Creditors may also benefit by compelling the judge upon conclusion of the
verification meeting to appoint a Creditors' Committee. 3 The Creditors' Committee
acts to advise the receiver. 54 However, the receiver is compelled to provide the
Creditors' Committee with all information sought and consult with the Committee
before taking certain actions.55 If the receiver rejects the Committee's proposal, the
receiver is required to inform the Committee and the Committee may opt to appeal

47. See id. at 1178 (defining "Preferred claims" as those claims which have a superior right to payment over
other claims). A preference may be obtained by a creditor numerous ways, including by perfecting a security
interest or obtaining the right to payment first, e.g., by obtaining a first mortgage versus holding a second mortgage.
id.
48. By deduction, "general claims" are claims that lack a security interest and preference. Such claims are
the most typical and are the last to be paid. See supranotes 45-46 (defining secured and preferred claims).
49. See Homick, supranote 24, at 25 (explaining disputed claims are determined by analyzing the debtor's
books and comparing them with the filing of the creditors' claim).
50. See iU (adding that if a dispute arises pertaining to any of the submitted claims and a reconciliation
cannot be obtained, the dispute is referred to the district court for a final determination); see also Achmadi &
Trommel, supranote 24 (claiming the receiver has the authority to decide whether or not a specific claim will be
admitted for purposes of payment from the liquidation of the debtor's estate).
51. See Hornick, supranote 24, at 24 (postulating "[a]s a practical matter, this is no longer a valuable right,
because even in the absence of bankruptcy proceedings, the Indonesian courts routinely prevent lenders foreclosing
on secured property on default"); see also Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (expounding secured creditors'
. exercise their rights as if there were no
rights are preserved despite the bankruptcy adjudication and may
bankruptcy").
52. See Homick, supra note 24, at 25 (noting that a creditor who does not utilize the option of foreclosing
on secured property within sixty days of a bankruptcy adjudication preserves its interest in the secured property).
53. See id at 25 (supplementing the judge's option to utilize a temporary Creditors' Committee through the
verification meeting to aid in advising the receiver). Despite the fact that the Creditors' Committee is entitled to
any requested information gathered by the receiver, the Creditors' Committee's influence is restricted to an advisory
function. Md.If the receiver rejects the committee's recommendation, the receiver must notify the committee and
the committee is allowed to appeal to the judge. Id. The judge's decision on the matter becomes the final resolution.
Id. The Creditors' Committee is rarely used, most likely due to the lack of significant bankruptcies existing in
Indonesia. Id
54. See id. (discussing the role and function of the Creditors' Committee under the 1906 bankruptcy law).
55. See id at25 (listing the actions which require the receiver to first consult with the Creditors' Committee
as: filing a claim on behalf of the bankrupt or pursuing an already existing claim; defending a claim against the
bankrupt, except for disputed claims arising out of the verification meeting; continuing or discontinuing the
bankrupt's business; and selling the bankrupts assets).
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to the judge.5 6 Under the Indonesian Bankruptcy Act, up to three creditors'

representatives are able to serve on a Creditors' Committee.57
Conversely, a debtor may attempt to protect himself by offering a plan of
composition at least eight days prior to the verification meeting.58 A plan of
composition is an agreement between the debtor and the general creditors to pay all
or part of the debts.5 9 Such a plan must be approved by a majority of the general
creditors present at the verification meeting, as well as the district court.60 Upon
claims
approval of the plan, the bankruptcy is canceled and the debtor's unsecured
6!

are satisfied to the extent of the composition agreement's terms.
Once a debtor is adjudicated bankrupt, the receiver commences liquidation of
the debtor's estate.62 Secured interests are given priority, in that all secured interests

must be fully satisfied before proceeds from the liquidation may be made available
to the other creditors.63 Provided enough money was procured through the
liquidation sale, remaining creditors are entitled to payment in proportion to their
filed claims."
Despite these pro-creditor provisions, however, the Indonesian Bankruptcy
Code has been deemed virtually useless.' Creditors seek collection of unpaid debts
through mechanisms outside the legal system, utilizing negotiation and "dubious

56. See Hornick,supranote 24, at 26 (explaning that in the event of an appeal, the judge's decision is final).
57. See id. at 25 (augmenting more then three creditors are sometimes allowed to serve on the creditors
committee).
58. See id. (mentioning the receiver also has the option to offer a plan of composition at any time if
authorized by the judge).
59. See id. (setting forth the function and requirements of a plan of composition under the 1906 Indonesian
Bankruptcy Code).
60. See id.(providing the formalities ofpursuing aplan ofcomposition as means ofprotection for the debtor
and avoiding the vulnerability that accompanies submission to adjudication by ajudge under the 1906 Indonesian

insolvency law).
61. See id. (relating the effect of approval of a plan of composition by a majority of a debtor's creditors and
the District Court).
62. See U at 26 (explaining the liquidation sale may transpire in the form of a public auction orby private

sale).
63. See id. at 26 (recognizing the receiver will create and issue a Schedule of Distribution reflecting the
amount of money collected from the liquidation and what the respective distributions will be). Secured creditors
are given priority, in that their secured debts must be fully satisfied before general creditors may receive payment.
Id. General creditors receive pro rata apportionment from any money generated as a result of the receiver managing
acompany-debtor's business, as well as the liquidation of the debtor's estate. Id, This parallels the system employed
by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
64. See id. (adding the 1906 insolvency law allows creditors to "set off" the amount owed by the debtor by
any amount owed by the creditor to the debtor).
65. See generally Indonesia'sBankruptcy CourtOpens, XINUANEWS AGENCY, Aug. 21, 1998 (explaining
the law gives creditors little leverage over debtors); see generally IndonesiaBankruptcy Law-2: Avoid Bentoel
Scenarios,supranote 41 (proclaiming the law's complexity discourages creditors from utilizing it); see generally
Kate Linebaugh, Bk Intl Indonesia, BN! File Bankruptcy Processvs Ometraco, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Sept.
11, 1998 (recognizing there are few remedies available to creditors to employ over debtors who refuse to pay their
debts). But cf Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (arguing the problem is not the law, but the inefficient
administration of justice).
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debt collection practices that wouldn't be acceptable elsewhere. '' 66 In addition,
creditors who do utilize the bankruptcy proceeding find themselves in the court
system for years before, if ever, benefitting from a remedy.67 Complicating the
situation, the Indonesian judiciary operates under a corrupt reputation, where the
party who offers the judge the most money comes out as the winner.68
Consequently, insolvent companies in Indonesia are able to escape liquidation and
continue operating for many years, leaving the creditor unpaid and virtually without
a remedy.' Furthermore, companies have not exercised the option to seek
suspension of payments7 ° and few instances exist in which the judiciary has
adjudicated a company to be bankrupt.7

66. IndonesiaBankruptcy Law-2: Avoid Bentoel Scenarios,supranote 41; see also Tmothy B. DSeino,
The "Asian Contagion:" UnderstandingCulturaland Legal Differences, 1998 AM. BANKRINST. J.LEXis 157,5-6
(Ronald J. Silverman ed., Hebb & Gitlin P.C.) (1998) (adding Indonesia lacks an organized informal mechanism
through which debtors can attempt to reach an amicable solution with their creditors); see also Grainne McCarthy,
IndonesiaBankruptcyLaw Seen StruggleAgainstCorraptioh,DowJoNEsNEWs SERvICE, Jul. 31, 1998 (asserting
under the 1906 insolvency law, "justice" depends on who pays the judge the most amount of money); see also
Sander Thoenes, Law Set to Push IndonesianDebtors Over the Edge: Tougher MeasuresMay Force Companies
to Face Up to Bankruptcy.LONDoN FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 20,1998, at 6 (recognizing that unless judges are paid more,
"... the bankruptcy system could become victim of the common practice of settling matters through the highest
bribe").
67. See DeSeino, supranote 66, at 6 (explaining the hiding of assets is an ordinary practice in Indonesia
due to the lack of a formal registration system for Indonesian companies); see also Indonesia Bankruptcy
Law-2: Avoid Bentoel Scenarios, supra note 41 (highlighting an instance in which the creditors of a bankrupt
Indonesian company waited six years for an adjudication and was finally settled); see generallyRI 'Lacks Experts
forNew BankruptcyLaw, 'supra note 41 (verifying the reality under the 1906 bankruptcy law was that thejudiciary
did not adjudicate the debtor's status quickly).
68. See McCarthy, supranote 66 (asserting under the 1906 insolvency law, "justice" depends on who pays
the judge the most amount of money); see alsoIndonesiaBankruptcy Laiw-2:Avoid Bentoel Scenarios,supranote
41 (characterizing the judicial system as corrupt and, consequently, prevents the utilization of the bankruptcy law);
see also Thoenes, supranote 66 (recognizing that unless judges are paid more, ". . . the bankruptcy system could
become victim of the common practice of settling matters through the highest bribe").
69. See Indonesia Bankruptcy Law-2: Avoid Bentoel Scenarios, supra note 41 (illustrating the lack of
judicial action through the elucidation of creditors who waited six years for an adjudication and finally settled with
the debtor); see also Indonesia'sBankruptcy CourtOpens, supra note 65 (asserting the 1906 insolvency law was
not utilized due to the lack of leverage it provided creditors with, which consequently enabled insolvent companies
to continue transacting business); see also Linebaugh, supranote 65 (implying the 1906 insolvency law was not
utilized because their was no remedy available to creditors and, thus, allowed insolvent debtors to continue
functioning).
70. See IndonesiaBankruptcy Law-2: Avoid Bentoel Scenarios,supra note 41.
71. See Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (determining this is due to Indonesia's cultural tendency to
avoid confrontation, as well as the inefficientjudiciary); see also Indonesia'sBankruptcy CourtOpens, supranote
65 (finding the bankruptcy law is not utilized because it provides limited leverage over debtors).
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B. The Asian FinancialCrisisand the Deteriorationof the IndonesianEconomy
Until mid-1997, economists viewed Indonesia as one of the top emerging
economies." Indonesia enjoyed three decades of stable growth, with real gross
domestic product averaging over seven percent per year.7' In fact, Indonesia's gross
domestic product per capita exceeded the United States; it enjoyed a stable rupiah, 74
and Indonesia reported inflation in single digits.75 But in 1997, the Asian financial
crisis began to surface in IndonesiaO6 and the growth came to a halt 7
The crisis originated in Thailand due to the country's high foreign debt and
weak financial system. Eventually, this resulted in the devaluation of Thailand's
baht.78 Concern over the depreciation of the baht created a heightened scrutiny of
79
other Asian economies in order to determine their respective economic viability.
Consequently, the problems in Indonesia's financial market also came under

examination.' Specifically, Indonesian banks had engaged in heavy borrowing and
also extended loans to domestic companies that were simultaneously financially
extended to foreign creditors. 8t Accordingly, the Indonesian rupiah experienced the
same devaluation as the baht. 2 By the end of October 1997, the rupiah had dropped

72. See Economic Trendsand Outlook supranote 1 (providing data demonstrating the economic strength
of the Indonesian economy preceding the Asian financial crisis); see also 1997-98 in Indonesia, supra note 1
(reviewing the economic strength of the Indonesian economy prior to the Asian financial crisis).
73. See Economic Trendsand Outlook, supra note 1 (adding this exceeded the United States).
74. The rupiah is the currency of Indonesia.
75. See Economic Trends and Outlook,supranote 1 (highlighting the Indonesian economy preceding the
Asian financial crisis).
76. See John W. Head, Lessonsfrom the Asian FinancialCrisis: The Role of the IMF and the U.S., 7 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 70,71 (1998) (stating the crisis first emerged in Thailand in July, 1997, moved into Indonesia
in October, 1997, and finally hit Korea in November, 1997).
77. See Economic TrendsandOutlook, supranote I (describing the severe economic predicament Indonesia
has experienced as a result of the Asian financial crisis); see generallyRiyadi, RIEconomy in Deep Water, andIt's
Sink or Swim Time, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 23, 1998 (identifying the domino effect of the devaluation of the rupiah
as ultimately increasing poverty throughout Indonesia).
78. See Head, supra note 76, at 71 (providing a history of how the Asian financial crisis originated and
spread throughout the region); see also Pate & Andrews, supranote 5, at 20 (describing the conception of the Asian
financial crisis and its spreading); see generally Krider, supranote 2. at 430 (adding Thailand's stock market also
collapsed). The baht is Thailand's currency.
79. See Head, supranote 76, at72 (explaining how the Asian financial crisis infiltrated Indonesia); seealso
Pate & Andrews, supranote 5, at 20 (examining the spread of the Asian financial crisis into Indonesia).
80. See Head,supranote 76, at72 (remarking that the banking industry was specifically exanined); seealso
Krider, supra note 2, at 431 (attributing the collapse of the financial sector to the lack of regulation of the
Indonesian banking industry).
81. See Head, note 75, at 72 (pinpointing the initial cause of the devaluation of the rupiah, as well as the
deterioration of the Indonesian economy); see also 1997-98 In Indonesia, supra note 1 (arguing private debt to
foreign creditors is most responsible for the distressed financial predicament of Indonesia); see also Krider,supra
note 2, at 431 (elaborating on how the Indonesian banking industry significantly attributed to the collapse of the
economy).
82. See Head,supranote 76, at 72 (providing the series of events that led to the devaluation of the baht and,
subsequently the rupiah); see also John J. Brandon, Asian Crisisand Change, CHRISTIAN Scr. MoNrToR, July 1,
1998 (adding that Thailand's baht suffered a total devaluation of sixty percent).
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in value by thirty-five percent, 3 and by January 1998, the rupiah had lost a total of
eighty-five percent of its value." As of mid-1998, the Indonesian economy
continued to deteriorate as Indonesian corporations found themselves unable to pay
domestic or foreign debts.' Consequently, domestic banks found themselves
financially stressed, and foreign banks became unwilling to extend any more money

to the country.
To date, the economic condition of Indonesia is poor. Economic forecasters
predict gross domestic product will drop between thirteen and twenty-five percent
for 1 9 9 8 .86 Gross domestic product per capita declined more than half of what it had
been in previous years." Inflation also skyrocketed up to eighty percent, and the
value of the rupiah continued to fall.' Furthermore, Indonesia's total foreign debt

is estimated at US$140 billion: US$73 billion is debt held by private institutions,
while the government owes US$66 billion.8 9 It is surmised that most of the private
foreign debt is in default," while thirty to seventy-five percent of banks' loans are,
or soon will be, in default.9
The practical effect of the devaluation of the rupiah is that the value of the debt
owed by Indonesian companies has tripled, while simultaneously decreasing the

83. See Head, supranote 76, at 72 (delineating the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Indonesia).
84. See Krider,supra note 2, at 431 (computing the value of the rupiah by comparing it against the U.S.

dollar).
85. See 1997-98 In Indonesia,supranote I (describing the initial interest of foreign creditors in Indonesia's
growing economy and then quick withdrawal upon the devaluation of the rupiah as the source of Indonesia's falling
economy).

86. See Economic Trends and Outlook, supra note 1 (setting forth several weaknesses with which the
Indonesian economy must contend); see also Jason Tedjasukmana, InternationalBusiness;Reorganizationof Debts
is Urgedforindonesians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at C2 (claiming the IMF predicts the gross domestic product
for 1998 to drop fifteen percent from 1997); see also Yearender:Asian EconomiesSeek Recovery ThroughReforms,

XNHuA NE S AGENCY, Dec. 27, 1998 (asserting the Indonesian government predicts a fourteen percent decline
in the gross domestic product for 1998, as compared to the six percent increase the preceding year).
87. See Economic TrendsandOutlook, supranote I (describing the severe economic predicament Indonesia
has experienced as a result of the Asian financial crisis).
88. See id (outlining the economic hurdles Indonesia must undertake in order to recuperate from the Asian
financial crisis).
89. See Id. But see Tedjasuknana, supranote 86 (asserting US$67 billion of the countries foreign debt is
owed by corporations). Although the statistics seem consistent with regard to the country's total amount of foreign
debt, the same is not true for how much of the foreign debt was accrued by the government and how much accrued
by corporations.
90. See Indonesian Foreign Debt 131.67 billion Dollarsat End February, AGENcE FR. PRESSE, May 14,
1998, at Int'l News (discussing the amount of debt Indonesia has and what the potential implications of this debt
will be).
91. See Hong Kong: IndonesianBanking System Largely Insolvent, MALAY. NAT'L NEWS AGENCY. May
27, 1998 (showing the threatening insolvency of the Indonesian banking industry).
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value of assets. 92 Consequently, approximately eighty percent of the country's
companies are rendered functionally bankrupt.93
C. The IMF's BailoutPackage
The continuing decline of the Indonesian economy eventually resulted in the
government requesting aid from the IMF.94 Originally, the IMF was formed to
facilitate foreign currency exchange with the hope of bolstering international trade
and global economic growth and stability. 95 Within the last two decades, however,

the IMF has increasingly engaged in lending functions. 96
To become a member within the IMF, a country must submit an initial quota, 97
refrain from imposing foreign currency exchange restrictions, and disclose
intentions pertaining to monetary and fiscal policies. 98 In return, member-countries

92. See Kadin Urges Foreign Creditorsto be Forgiving,JAKARTA POST, Oct. 5, 1998, at 11 (exploring the
futileness of negotiations between debtors and creditors and arguing that writing-off these debts is the only feasible
solution); see also CreditorsInsist Debtors Sell Noncore Businesses, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 4, 1998, at News
(presenting the difficulties associated with selling assets valued so low as a result of the devaluation of the rupiah);
see also Reiner S., Agreement Between Debtors and Creditors Still Far Off, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 3, 1998
(demonstrating the low value of assets presents an obstacle to negotiations); see generally Vikram Khanna, Indon
CorporateDebt: Tune to End Pantomime,SING. BUS. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1998, at 6 (expounding how the devaluation
of the rupiah has impacted the value of assets).
93. See Econit: 80% F Businesses of Indonesia Conglomerates Face Bankruptcy, INDON. NAT'L NEWS
AGENCY, June 8, 1998 (examining the economic health of the Indonesian corporate sector); see also Asian
Chemical News: Indonesia: Hanging on the Rupiah, CHEMICAL BUS. NEWSBASE, Aug. 21, 1998 (looking
specifically at the chemical and petrochemical industries in Indonesia); see also Tjedasukmana. supra note 86
(asserting the decline of the country's economy resulted in mass bankruptcy among corporations); see also Chris
Watch, IndonesiaCorporateDebt: Tune to End Pantomime,SNG. BUS. TIMwES,
Aug. 24. 1998, at 6 (explaining the
majority of debt procured by Indonesian companies occurred when the rupiah was worth five times more than
currently).
94. See Head, supra note 76, at 72 (providing a brief history of how the Asian financial crisis infiltrated
Indonesia); see also Economic Trends and Outlook, supra note 1 (discussing the economic impact the Asian
financial crisis had on Indonesia).
95. See Pate & Andrews, supra note 5, at 20 (commenting that the inception of the IMF occurred during
the Great Depression when a gold shortfall prompted many nations to quit utilizing the gold standard and
subsequently suppressed foreign currency exchange among those countries); see also Claudio Grossman & Daniel
D. Bradlow, Are We Being PropelledTowards a People-CenteredTransnationalLegal Order?,9 AM. UJ. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 1, 2-3 (1993) (suggesting the IMF was formed with one of its goals being to be able to pierce the
sovereignty of member states with the larger objective of an international monetary order in mind); see also Cynthia
C. Lichtenstein, Dealing With Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New InternationalInitiativesfor the New World of
Volatile CapitalFlows To and From EmergingMarkets, 29 MCGEORGEL. REV. 807,807 (1998) (claiming the IMF
inception occurred in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire).
96. See Pate & Andrews, supra note 5, at 20 (explaining the lending function of the IMF is popularly
believed to be its primary function).
97. See id. (adding there is approximately US$200 billion in the fund available to member-countries for
loans). The United States has the largest quota, contributing around eighteen percent of the fund. Id. Consequently,
this can give the United States a veto over significant issues. Id.
98. See i. (emphasizing"... the IMF has no inherent authority over a member's policies").
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may choose their preferred method of exchange valuation.99 The IMF monitors each
member-country's actions, as well as their ability to repay foreign debt. 100
It is from the lending function that the IMF acquires its real power over the
members by using the funds available for lending purposes to influence members'
monetary and financial policies.' 1 Specifically, the IMF requires the membercountry wanting to borrow money to submit a plan that delineates a pragmatic
strategy that will resolve the problems causing the deficiency of funds, as well as
the repayment of the loan. 1°2 The fundamental elements of these plans must cover
topics including performance measures, 1 3 emergency action,' °4 financial sector

99. See id.at20 (discussing the membership requirements of the IMF); see also 1997-981n Indonesia,supra
note I (noting Indonesia has earned the reputation of maintaining a "prudent monetary policy"); see also Grossman
& Bradlow, supra note 95, at 3 (implying that the only limitation infringed upon the member states' currency
exchange method was that it be convertible without hindrance).
100. See Pate & Andrews, supra note 5, at 20 (defining the role of the IMF in overseeing the activities of its

members).
101. Id. (stating the IMF lends money to those members who are temporarily unable to supply foreign
currency exchanged needed to satisfy foreign debts); see also Grossman & Bradlow, supranote 95, at 5 (asserting
the member states relinquished a portion of their control over monetary policies upon joining the IMF in exchange
for the enjoyment of certain benefits, such as financial support in times of need). The IMF will also loan money
to members whose economies are suffering by enlisting the financial help from other sources, such as the World
Bank. See Pate & Andrews, supra note 5, at 20. But see Testimony January 27, 1999 HonorableLawrence H.
Summers Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Senate ForeignRelations InternationalEconomicPolicy, Export and
Trade Promotion InternationalMonetary Fund, Global Financing Crisis, FED. DOCUMENT CLEANNG HOUSE
CONG.TESTMIONY, Jan. 27, 1999, at Capital Hill Hearing Testimony (asserting the IMF has no authority to enforce
any policy changes promised in exchange for loans).
102. See Pate & Andrews, supranote 5, at 20 (explaining the IMP's requirements for loaning money to its
financially-troubled members); see also Head, supranote 76, at 70 (stating the IMF only lends monetary support
to countries complying with the policies sought by the IMF); see also Krider, supra note 2, at 433 (asserting the
IMF required Indonesia to engage in reforming the financial and corporate sectors in exchange for monetary
support); see generallyl997-98In Indonesia, supranote I (reflecting the monetary support provided by the IMF
was in reaction to the economic reformation instituted by Indonesia).
103. See Pate & Andrews, supranote 5, at 21 (explaining the IMF utilizes macroeconomic measures to
determine the success of reform plans). Among the measures the IMF looks at are inflation rates, growth in gross
domestic product, and the current size of the foreign currency exchange account with the IMP. Id. at 20. In 1997
the Indonesian government made a fatal decision when it decided to allow the rupiah to float in an effort to maintain
the currency exchange rate. See 1997-98 In Indonesia,supranote I. Subsequently, inflation occurred in response
to the devaluation of the rupiah, as well as massive liquidity additions into the banking system. id. Despite various
efforts by the Indonesian government, the inflation rate has yet to be reduced. Id
104. See Pate & Andrews" supra note 5, at 20 (noting the immediate objective of the reform plans is
stabilization in the foreign currency exchange market, but this should be done by addressing the financial and
corporate structural problems and not by raising interest rates).
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reform,' 5 corporate sector reform," recessional impact," and progress." Only
after submission of this plan will the IMF loan money.1°9
Beginning in October 1997, Indonesia signed the first of several agreements
with the IMF."° Due to the numerous revisions to the original agreement, as well
as the various subjects covered, "[t]he result is a complex, multi-faceted program
to address macroeconomic imbalances, financial weaknesses, and the loss of private

sector confidence.... The agreement provides for economic policies and targets
seven key areas, including monetary and interest rate policy, banking sector
regulation, budgetary support for vulnerable groups of society, state enterprise
reform, corporate debt restructuring, and
reform and privatization, structural
12
reform.
judicial
and
bankruptcy
The result of the agreement is a US$40 billion bailout package arranged by the
IMF.113 It is intended to restore confidence in the Indonesian economy by promoting

105. See id (discussing the need to restructure the financial institutions includes a heightened focus on the
country's banking system). The IMF will provide these institutions with technical assistance. Id. Additionally, in
the context of the Asian Financial Crises, the governments of Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia created restructuring
agencies with the autonomous power to liquidate those banks severely troubled and to restructure others, as well
as to privatize some banks while merging others. la, at 21. In Indonesia, the created restructuring agency is the
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Id.; see also Lichtenstein, supranote 95, at 812 (emphasizing the
importance of financial sector reform and a domestic banking system to the prevention of an economic collapse,
as well as maintaining a stable economy).
106. See Pate & Andrews, supranote 5, at 21 (expounding resolution relies on focusing on the underlying
problems that exist in the way business traditionally has been conducted throughout the country). A common
problem with the Asian countries was the lack ofadequate information available to investors. Thus, these countries'
plans focused on reconstructing disclosure, accounting, and auditing standards. Id Additionally, ofprimary concern
It is in this
with the Asian countries was removing all existing obstacles preventing voluntary debt restructuring. I&a
category that the focus fell onto Indonesia's bankruptcy law. Id.
107. See Pate & Andrews, supra note 5, at 21 (advocating the allowance of budget deficits in exchange for
increased spending because such increased spending minimizes the impact ofrecession and improves the economy).
108. See id. (postulating progress requires leaders open to changes and dedicated to implementing reform).
Since the commencement of the Asian financial crises, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia have all come under the
power of new leaders. Id Unlike the other two countries, however, Indonesia has continued to struggle even under
new President Habibie's Administration. 1d.
109. See Pate & Andrews, supra note 5,at 20 (reviewing the IMFs criteria for extending a loan to a
financially-troubled member).
110. See 1997-98 In Indonesia, supra note I (adding amendments to this agreement were signed on the
following dates: January 15, 1998; April 10, 1998; June 24, 1998; and July 29, 1998).
111. Id.; see also StructuralReformsAgreed with IMF,TAxNEWS SERVICES, Apr. 30,1998. On January 15,
1998, the IMF and Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies establishing "a
comprehensive strategy for stabilizing and reforming the Indonesian economy." See 1997-98 In Indonesia, supra
note 1. Updates and modifications followed this in a Supplementary Memorandum. See supra,note 110 (providing
the dates of the subsequent amendments to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies).
112. See StructuralReforms Agreed with IMF, supra note 111 (outlining the economic reforms required
pursuant to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies signed by Indonesia and the IMF).
113. See Head, supranote 76 (explaining the sources of the funding include: US$10 billion from the IMF,
US$4.5 billion from the World Bank, US$3.5 billion from the Asian Development Bank, US$5 billion from Japan,
US$5 billion from Singapore, US$3 billion from the United States, US$1 billion each from other Asian countries,
and US$5 billion in contingency reserves by Indonesia); see also Economic Trends and Outlook, supra note I
(discussing the IMF's role in helping Indonesia restore its economy); see also Krider, supra note 2, at 427-33
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monetary and fiscal policies, which are designed to restore confidence to financial

markets.11 4 Further, the agreement restructures the financial sector by implementing
measures 6to insure it remains sound.' 15 It also provides deregulation and trade
11

reforms.

In exchange for the money extended to Indonesia, Indonesia agreed to address

the inadequacies of its economy,1 7 including the implementation of a new
bankruptcy law. 1 Specifically, the IMF established a deadline of August 20, 1998,
for Indonesia to complete amendments to the bankruptcy law that are conducive to
economic reform and recovery. 9 A team comprised of experts from the IMF, the
Cabinet Secretariat, the National Development Planning Board, and the Minister of
Justice worked together to formulate a government decree of bankruptcy
stipulations to substitute the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code. 12
The driving reason behind the revision of Indonesia's old and well-established
bankruptcy law is that it was viewed as inadequate to remedy the country's

(considering the monetary support lent by the IMF in an effort to aid economically devastated Indonesia). It is
expected that the total amount of money to be lent to the Asian countries will be approximately US$118 billion.
Id. at 433. This will be the largest bailout package ever provided by the IMF, surpassing the US$48 billion dollar
package given to Mexico in 1994. Id.
114. See Head, supra note 76, at 72 (providing the rationale behind the IMF bailout package devised on
behalf of Indonesia); see also Bruce Clark et al, IndonesiaReckons Cost of IMF Aid Package,FIN. TIME, Nov.
1, 1997, at 3 (describing the intent of the bailout package provided by the IMF); see also Pate & Andrews, supra
note 5, at 20 (stating the IMF conditions monetary support upon the country engaging in restructuring reforms to
insure a return to economic stability).
115. See Head, supra note 76, at 72 (discussing the motivation of the financial bailout package given to

Indonesia by the IMF).
116. See d (specifying how the IMF bailout package intended to insure the Indonesian economy would
return to stability).
117. See 1997-98 In Indonesia, supra note 1 (mentioning the continuous deterioration of Indonesia's
economy resulted in subsequent revisions of the agreement). In October, 1997, Indonesia signed the first of a series
letters of intent with the IM providing for a three-year recovery program sponsored by the loans from the IMF.
See id.Following this were several amendments to the original agreement. See supranote 110 (providing the dates
of the amendments to the agreement with the IMF).
118. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (mentioning corporate sector reform under IMF); see also
1997.98 In Indonesia, supra note 1 (explaining although the letter of intent signed in October, 1997 called for
legislative reform, this became even more evident in the letter of intent submitted in January, 1998); see also
Economic Trends and Outlook, supra note I (clarifying the agreement between Indonesia and the IMF was

amended to address continuing problems within the Indonesian economy and the focus of the agreement was
expanded to include reformation of the bankruptcy law); see also StructuralReforms Agreed with IMF,supranote
111 (outlining the various reforms Indonesia was expected to implement as a result of the Memorandum of
Economic and Financial Policies signed by Indonesia and the IMF).
119. See Bankruptcy, ForeclosureLaws May MissDeadline,THIAL. BUS. DAY, Oct. 9,1998. Indonesia has
met this deadline and the amendments to the bankruptcy law have been enacted and are currently being
implemented. See infra notes 126-54 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of the 1998 amendments
to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code and the commencement of operating the commercial court).
120. See Indonesia: Muladi to Confer with House Factions on Socialization of Government Decree on
Bankruptcy, INDON. NAT'L NEws AGENCY, Apr. 14, 1998 [hereinafter Muladi to Confer with House Factions]
(observing the completion of the draft decree on bankruptcy).
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suffering economy. 21 Consequently, in August 1998, the new bankruptcy law was
enacted. 122
III. THE INSOLVENCY REGULATIONS
The retirement of the original insolvency law did not result in the enactment of
a single new law. Rather, Indonesia created a comprehensive package of three
regulations: the amendments to the bankruptcy law,12 the Jakarta Initiative,' 2 ' and
INDRA.'" These regulations provide alternative means governing how debtors and
creditors may deal with the financial plight of the Indonesian private sector and aid
in the restoration of a stable Indonesian economy.
A.

The Bankruptcy Proceedings

Due to the urgent need to provide an amended bankruptcy law conducive to
economic reformation, the new regulations originally went into effect under a

Presidential decree and were later presented to the House of Representatives for a
vote.' 2 The new regulations are aimed at eliminating inefficient companies while
simultaneously restoring confidence in the Indonesian economy.' 27 Aside from

121. See Can Bankruptcy Law Solve Debt Problem?JAKARTA POST, Oct. 19, 1998, at News (arguing it is

not the bankruptcy law, but the Indonesian judiciary that needs reformation); see also Indonesia'sBankruptcy Court
Opens, supranote 65 (mentioning the 19016] law was not utilized because it failed to provide creditors with a
remedy); see also UPI Focus: Indonesia Launches a Bankruptcy Law, U.P.I., Aug. 20, 1998 [hereinafter UPI
Focus] (stating the 1906 insolvency law was seen as inadequate to cope with the current crisis of widespread
insolvency throughout Indonesia); cf. Achmadi & Trommel, supra note 24 (asserting "[t]he real problem in
Indonesia is not bad law, but the inefficient administration of justice"). According to a survey conducted by the
American Bankruptcy Institute, a fundamental objective of any bankruptcy law should be to provide a "fresh start"
for the debtor, or to maximize the amount of the debtor's assets distributed to the respective creditors. Id.
Indonesia's original Bankruptcy Code had met this criteria, and, thus, should not necessarily have been discarded.
Id.
122. See infra notes 126-54 and accompanying text (discussing the 1998 amendments to 1906 insolvency
law, thus resulting in the creation of a new law).
123. See infra notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 155-98 and accompanying text (examining the provisions of the Jakarta Initiative).
125. See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (reviewing the function and requirements of INDRA).
126. See Christine T. Tjandraningsih, Indonesia'sParliamentPassesBill on BankruptcyRules, JAPANECON.
NEwSWIRE, July 24, 1998 (adding President Suharto had signed the law on April 22, 1998); see also House Passes
New Bankruptcy Bill, INDoN. NAT'L NEws AGENCY, July 24, 1998 [hereinafter Indonesia: House PassesNew
BankruptcyBill] (providing the framework for the creation and implementation of the 1998 amendments to 1906
Indonesian Bankruptcy Code); see also Indonesia's ParliamentPasses Bill on Bankruptcy Rules, ASIAN ECON.
NEWs, July 27, 1998 [hereinafter Indonesia'sParliamentPassesBill on Bankruptcy Rules] (exploring the strengths
of the amendments to the insolvency law).
127. See Indonesia'sBankruptcy CourtOpens, supra note 65 (providing a brief summary of the reasons
behind enacting the 1998 amendments); seealsoGrainneMcCarthy,IndonesiaBankruptcyLaw-3:DelugeofCases
Expected,DOWJONES NEWS SERVICE, July 31,1998 [hereinafter Deluge of CasesExpected] (highlighting the quick

deadlines required under the 1998 amendments); see also UPI Focus, supranote 121 (noting the new law requires
an adjudication of the debtor's statits within thirty days of the filing of the petition). Under the new law, a debtor's
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establishing the substantive aspects of bankruptcies, the new law created an original

court specialized to handle the deluge of bankruptcies expected as a result of the
Asian financial crisis.
1.

The Commercial Court

The new regulations established a commercial court in Jakarta,'2 and it is
expected that as implementation of the new regulations proceeds, more courts will
be erected in Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, and Medan. 129 The commercial court
falls under the jurisdiction of
a district court,"t o "which is the first level of the
131
hierarchy."
court
Indonesian
In expectation of the deluge of bankruptcy filings expected under the new
regulations, forty-five judges specializing in commercial law were trained for the
sole purpose of facilitating the new court and cases. 132 Each case filed under the
new regulations will be presided over by a panel of three magistrates. 33 If the panel
delivers a verdict of bankrupt, a supervisory judge is appointed to oversee the

status must be adjudicated within sixty days. See infra notes 143-44, 147-48 and accompanying text (delineating
the substantive aspects of the 1998 amendments to the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code). Alternatively, under
a suspension of payments, the debtor has up to 270 days to formulate a repayment plan agreeable to the creditors.
See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing the suspension of payments alternative).
128. See Indonesia Bankruptcy Law Comes Into Force; First Court Open, DOWJONES NEWS SERViCE, Aug.
20, 1998 [hereinafter First Court Open] (explaining atotal of seventeen judges will preside in this new court); see
also Indonesia Commercial Court to Be Operational Sept 1,No Cases Filed Yet, AFXAP, Aug. 27, 1998
[hereinafterlndonesia Commercial Court] (providing the procedure through which abankruptcy is to be adjudicated
in the new commercial court under the 1998 amendments to the 1906 insolvency law); see also Indonesia's
Bankruptcy Court Opns, supra note 65 (presenting the reasoning behind the establishment of a new court); see
also Indonesian Government Moves to Boost Private Sector, DEuTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 20, 1998
(considering the new court and why it was created). This is comparable to the insolvency system utilized in the
United States, in that the United States has granted exclusive jurisdiction to one court specialized to administer
insolvency proceedings. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980)).
129. See Benny S. Tabalujan, Give Jakarta's Bankruptcy Law a Chance, SING. Bus. TIMES, May 12, 1998
(describing the implementation of the recently created commercial court).
130. See Indonesiav Muladi to Confer with House Factions, supra note 120 (explaining the Indonesian
judicial system recognizes four types of courts: district courts, military tribunals, religious courts and administrative
courts). For administrative andjudicial purposes, Indonesia is divided into twenty-seven provinces. See REYNOLDS
& FLORES, supra note 24, at E115.6. These twenty-seven provinces are then divided into 246 districts. Id. In each
district, there are fifty-five municipalities and state courts of first jurisdiction. Id A court of appeal also exists in
each of the twenty-seven districts. Id.
The Supreme Court is located in Jakarta. Id There are also religious courts
for Islamic matters, which are parallel to the civil courts at the state level, and appeals are made to the religious high
court. Id
131. Tabalujan, supra note 129; see also supra note 130 (analyzing the structure ofthe Indonesianjudiciary).
132. See House Passes New Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 126. Although, at the time of the commencement
of the commercial court, only eighteen judges had completed the training and were ready to preside over cases. See
supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing the opening of the commercial court).
133. See Indonesia Commercial Court, supra note 128 (establishing the procedure through which a
bankruptcy will be adjudicated in the new commercial court under the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian
Bankruptcy Code).
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liquidation and distribution of the company's assets.1 These supervisory judges

survey the activities of the receivers.13

The new commercial court only hears cases involving unsecured creditors,
leaving secured creditors to continue seeking remedies from the traditional courts.' 36
Furthermore, the new bankruptcy court is intended to be a court of last resort
because proceedings should only be enacted against those debtors who are
unwilling to cooperate in paying their debts despite their ability to do so, and
against debtors who are acting in bad faith.1 37 As such, the new law strives to force

default debtors who have the means to pay their debts to negotiate with their
creditors a repayment schedule, or in the case of those debtors unable to pay off
their debts, to expedite the liquidation of the debtor's assets.13
2. Procedure
Under the new law, bankruptcies appear to vary according to the individual
circumstances and what actions the respective debtor and individual creditors
decide to undertake. Specifically, the bankruptcy may result in liquidation of the
debtor's estate or it may proceed under a suspension of payments.1 39 The new law
is full of technical deadlines, all of which are aimed at insuring the debtor's case is

134. See id. (adding the commercial court has seven supervisory judges).
135. See ki.(noting the receivers must obtain the supervisory judge's permission to liquidate any of the
debtors assets); see also Thoenes, supranote 66 (remarking these independent receivers replaced the state receiver
agency that existed under the 1906 insolvency law); see also Tabalujan, supra note 129 (emphasizing the
significance of this change as compared to the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
136. See Barry Porter, Bankruptcy Court Offers Ray of Hope, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 21, 1998, at
5; cf.Horick, supranote 24, at 24 (explaining that under the original insolvency law the effect of an adjudication
of bankruptcy yielded alien over the debtors property) Additionally, in the case of secured creditors, a creditor may
elect to liquidate the debtor's assets within sixty days of the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. See id.Note, the
application of the new bankruptcy law only to general creditors is likely to have an immense impact on the
utilization of the bankruptcy law for reasons discussed previously. See supranotes 65-71. Compare this exclusion
of secured creditors from the jurisdiction of the commercial court to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court which has
exclusive jurisdiction of all insolvency matters. See U.S. CoNsT., art. I; see also Flics & Ireland, supranote 29, at
427.
137. See Going Bankrupt,JAKARTA PosT, Oct. 17,1998, at Opinion [hereinafter Going Bankrupt] (providing

the intended purpose of the insolvency law pursuant to the 1998 amendments); see also Shoeb Kagda, Banks
Against Discounts on Indon Loan Repayments, SING. BUs. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1998 (citing the statements of a vicepresident of a bank, who claimed the use of the bankruptcy court was the "least attractive option").
138. See Going Bankrupt, supranote 137 (arguing only after the debtor has been offered the alternative of
suspension of payments will a bankruptcy proceeding resume).
139. See infra notes 147, 152 and accompanying text (describing how a case might proceed under the 1998
amendments). This mirrors the general framework of the U.S. bankruptcy law, which allows for liquidation of the
debtor pursuant to Chapter 7 and reorganization of the debtor's debts under, Chapter 11 or Chapter 13. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151326; see also Flics & Ireland, supra note 29, at 426 (defining Chapter 7 liquidates the debtor in
anticipation of distributing the assets to the debtor's creditors and, in the case of an entity, winding up the entity,
whereas Chapter 11 reorganize the debtor, and in the case of an entity, the debtor retains control and management).
In the United States, the bankruptcy law favors the reorganization that occurs under the Chapter I1 election. Id
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adjudicated quickly. t4° Furthermore, it provides a more neutral framework because
safeguards exist for debtors and creditors alike.
The new regulations provide for several ways in which a bankruptcy proceeding
can be commenced. First, a debtor with two or more creditors can be declared
bankrupt by court order if the debtor has defaulted on at least one of the debts 41 and
at least two creditors file suit against the debtor.142 Either a creditor or the
government can petition the court for such a ruling, and the regulation requires
adjudication within thirty days of the filing of such an application. 43 In either event,
the commercial court must first extend the option of suspension of payments to the
debtor before an immediate adjudication can transpire. ' 44 Under the suspension of
payments option, the debtor's payments to creditors are suspended while the debtor
negotiates with the creditors a debt restructuring plan.145 This option has inherent

value to both the debtor and the creditors: the debtor is able to potentially avoid
losing his business and the creditors are likely to receive more value for their
debts.1 46
The new regulation provides creditors protection in several ways. Most

importantly, the new regulation provides creditors with a quick remedy for winding

140. See, e.g., McCarthy, Deluge of Cases Expected, supra note 127 (stating the debtor's status must be
adjudicated within thirty days of the filing of the petition and limiting the appeals period to an additional thirty
days).
141. See Undang-undang
Kepailitan
<http://www.geocities.comlCollegePark/
Field/4492/Library/pailit-l.htn> (visited Feb. 21, 1990) (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (providing
a rough English translation of the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code as amended in 1998); see also House PassesNew
Bankruptcy Bill, supranote 126(summarizing the requirements to file a petition for bankruptcy under the 1998
amendments); see McCarthy, Deluge of Cases Expected, supra 127 (establishing the general provisions of the
insolvency law pursuant to the 1998 amendments); see also Tjandraningsih, supra note 126 (explaining the
technical provisions of the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian insolvency law).
142. See Undang-undang Kepeilitan, supra note 141 (supplyingarough English translation of the Indonesian
Bankruptcy Code as amended in 1998), see also House Passes New Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 126 (stating the
essential requirements for filing a petition under the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code); see
generally Jakarta Court Rejects IFC Bankruptcy Claim Against Dharmala, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 8. 1998
(discussing the significance of this change and how it created confusion in a specific case when a creditor filed a
petition against its debtor).
143. See, e.g., Tjandraningsih, supranote 126 (adding the appeals period is limited to an additional thirty
days).
144. See Going Bankrupt, supranote 137 (arguing the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code
intended the commercial court to be a court of last resort). Under the suspension of payments option, the debtor has
270 days to present a plan for repayment of the debts that is acceptable to the creditors. See infra notes 147-50 and
accompanying text (providing a substantive explanation of how the suspension of payments option transpires).
Note, this is similar to the automatic stay that goes into effect upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy, under
any Chapter, in the United States. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see also Flics & Ireland, supra note 29, at 426 (explaining
the automatic stay protects debtors from all creditors from taking any action against the debtor).
145. See Going Bankrupt, supra note 137 (discussing the positive impact of the suspension of payments
alternative on debtors and creditors); see also Homick, supranote 24, at26 (explaining the same process under the
title "moratorium").
146. See GoingBankrupt,supra note 137 (providing the rationale behind the requirement that the commercial
court extend the suspension of payment option prior to proceeding with the bankruptcy proceeding).
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up of a company within sixty days, including the appeal period. 47 If a debtor elects
the suspension of payments option, the commercial court must hold a hearing
within forty-five days to determine whether the suspension of payments should be
extended to a total of 270 days."' If the 270 day period of suspension of payments
is granted and the debtor and creditors fail to agree on a rescheduling plan, the
commercial court must adjudicate the debtor as bankrupt. 49 Conversely, if an
agreement is reached on the terms of the rescheduling of debt payments, the

commercial court legalizes the terms of the agreement, making it binding on all
parties.15° Furthermore, a creditor or the state prosecutor can request the court to
confiscate a bankrupt debtor's assets. 5 ' Additionally, creditors can ask the court to
nullify grants made by a debtor within the last twelve months if the debtor knew or
52
should have known it would be detrimental to a creditor.
The new regulations also provide for debtor protection. Primarily, the new
regulations allow for a nine-month suspension ofpayments period, enabling debtors
to work with a receiver to formulate a plan of how to pay creditors.5 5 A debtor who
is unable to pay the loan repayments may receive a deferral from the court if the

147. SeeMcCarthy,DelugeofCasesFpected,supranote126 (specifying the adjudication ofthe debtor must
transpire within thirty days of the filing of the petition and a limitation of thirty days is placed on appeals); see also
Richard Borsuk &Michael Casey, JakartaCourtforBankruptcyWillBe Set Up, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1998,
at I (adding that appeals may only be made to the Supreme Court on questions of law, excluding evidentiary
matters and intermediate appellate courts from the appeals process). Compare this with the time frame under the
1906 Indonesia Bankruptcy Code. See supranotes 66-68 (arguing creditors found themselves in the court system
for years without benefitting from a remedy).
148. See Riyadi & Aloysius Unditu, Skeptics Unmoved by Commercial Court,JAKARTA POST, Sept. 28,1998
(adding the commercial court must adjudicate the debtor bankrupt at this hearing if half of the creditors reject the
debtor's proposal for a 270 day suspension).
149. See id. (noting the debtor can be declared bankrupt prior to the expiration of the 270 day period if a
creditor, supervising judge, or receiver request such an action). The commercial court may initiate such an action
on its own if it determines that the debtor is causing loss to the creditors or if the debtor transferred assets without
the receiver's permission. l
150. See Riyadi & Unditu, supranote 148 (explaining the procedural aspects and legal consequences of the
suspension of payments option). The commercial court may reject the rescheduling plan agreed to by the debtor
and creditors and declare the debtor bankrupt if the court finds the agreement is: 1) legally flawed, 2) acquired
through manipulation or conspiracy among creditors, or 3) the debtor failed to pay the administrator's fee. Id The
administrator's fee is determined at the commercial court's discretion. Id
151. See Tjandraningsih, supranote 126 (providing specific provisions under the 1998 amendments to the
Indonesian Bankruptcy Code that provide expeditious actions); see also Borsuk & Casey, supranote 147 (clarifying
a liquidation order will prevent the hiding of assets).
152. See Tjandraningsih, supranote 126 (demonstrating how the 1998 amendments provide creditors with
prompt proceedings). Under the U.S. bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy court has the authority to void transfers of
money or property of the debtor's estate if the transfer was not a legitimate transaction or violated another section
of the bankruptcy code, e.g., payment on a pro-petition debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (Supp. IV 1980). This is
intended to prevent the debtor from shifting assets and to insure the highest apportionment of the debtor's estate
to the respective creditors as possible. Furthermore, under the bankruptcy law in the United States, any payment
on a legitimate debt before the distribution of the debtor's estate to all other creditors of equal priority, i.e., secured,
will also be reversed in an effort to guarantee the equal treatment of all creditors similarly situated. Id. § 508(a).
153. See McCarthy, Delugeof Cases Expected,supranote 126 (highlighting the provisions supporters of the
1998 amendments find appealing).
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debtor presents a proposal for settlement with the creditor, although the case must
then be heard within forty-five days. s4
B. The JakartaInitiative

The Jakarta Initiative is formed by the Indonesian government, banks, and other

institutions.5 5 and was formed to provide debtors and creditors with a negotiating
framework so that they may utilize the advantages of INDRAY'5 It formulates
guidelines for debtors and creditors to negotiate, which are aimed at stimulating the
restructuring and recovery of the Indonesian private sector.5 The Jakarta Initiative

is expected to establish a starting pointfordebt restructuring negotiations,

and the

government views it as an integral aspect of economic recovery. 5 9
In order to facilitate the implementation of the Jakarta Initiative, the Indonesian
government has established a task force,' 6 which is to work in conjunction with a

154. See Tjandraningsih, supranote 126 (illustrating the 1998 amendments' equal treatment of debtors and
creditors); see also Riyadi & Unditu, supra note 148 (delineating the provisions of the suspension of payments
option under the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
155. See Indonesian Govt Not to Help Private Foreign Debt Repayment, ASIA PULSE, Nov. 3, 1998, at
Nationwide Financial News [hereinafterIndonesian Govt] (adding the World Bank is indicative of the type of other
institutions involved in the formation).
156. SeeLiteratureon JakartaInitiative,JAKARTA INITIATwvETAsKFoRcE(1998) (clarifying the interaction
of INDRA, the Jakarta Initiative, and the Bankruptcy Code as amended in 1998); see also infra notes 199-206 and
accompanying text (examining INDRA).
157. See The Jakarta Initiative, Preamble (1998) (Indon.) (stating the Initiative's goals include a speedy
corporate recovery, reduction of poverty, and generation of tax revenue); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative"
on CorporateRestructuring,INT'LMARKETINSIGHTTRADEOPPRTUNTIES INQUIRiES, Sept. 10,1998 [hereinafter
Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative"] (providing an overview of the Jakarta Initiative).
158. See Will 'JakartaInitiative' Succeed in its Daunting Purpose?,JAKARTA POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at 5
[hereinafter Will 'JakartaInitiative' Succeed] (expounding the general framework of the Jakarta Initiative).
159. See The Jakarta Initiative, Government Policy, (1998) (Indon.) (expounding that mutual agreement
between creditors and debtors is imperative to a stabilization of the Indonesian economy); see also Conference on
Debt Begins, JAKARTA PosT, Nov. 3, 1998, at News [hereinafter Conferenceon Debt Begins] (emphasizing the
importance of out-of-court settlements among debtors and creditors to restoring the Indonesian economy's health);
see also Indonesian Govt, supranote 155 (referring to statements made by the Indonesian Coordinating Minister
for Economy, Finance and Industry); see also New Move on Debt,JAKARTA POST,Sept. 11, 1998, at 4 [hereinafter
New Move on Debt] (claiming creditors are more likely to receive payment pursuant to the Jakarta Initiative versus
pursuing a remedy through bankruptcy); see also Henny Sender, Indonesia'sNew ProposalFails to Impress Its
Creditors:Are Both Sides Still at an Impasse in Negotiationson Restructuring PrivateSector's Foreign Debt,
ASIAN WAm ST. J., (stating the government fears economic recovery will be prevented if debtors are forced into
bankruptcy and subsequently liquidate their asgets).
160. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.). The Jakarta Initiative Task
Force is established under the supervision of the Chairman of Indonesia Private-Sector Debt and is comprised of
a team. I, The duties of the Task Force include overseeing the expedition of out-of-court negotiations and provide
referrals to the commercial court to either continue restructuring negotiations under a court-supervised process
pursuant to the suspension of payments provision of the bankruptcy law, or to aid court rulings to adopt out-of-court
settlements and binding all creditors pursuant thereto. ILi; see also Embassy of the United States of America,
Jakarta, Indonesia <http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econrhni-corpres.html> (visited Jan. 11, 1999) (copy on file
with The TransnationalLawyer) (summarizing the creation of the Task Force and listing its primary duties); see
also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supra note 157 (noting the government of Indonesia has designated Capital
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Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee procuring members from the private

sector.16 The Jakarta Initiative is legally non-binding and aims at facilitating out-ofcourt negotiations between the debtor and respective creditors.

62 Because it is non-

binding, debtors and creditors voluntarily agree to subject themselves to the
guidelines of the Jakarta Initiative and to commence debt restructuring negotiations
thereunder. The Jakarta Initiative is intended to provide parties, both foreign and

domestic, with recourse before attempting a settlement under NDRA

63

and is

regulations. 1"

meant to complement the new bankruptcy
The four key points of the Jakarta Initiative include the adoption of principles,
the utilization of the Jakarta Initiative Task Force, regulatory changes, and a

corporate restructuring advisory committee. 6
1. Adoption of Principles
As a means to facilitate the negotiations and insure the success of any

settlement agreed on, the Jakarta Initiative calls for the implementation of various
standards pertaining to such areas as organization and representation, role of senior

management, standstill and interim financing, information, company restructuring,
advisory report, negotiation of restructuring plan, pre-negotiated bankruptcy plans,
and non-discrimination. 6 These standards were established with the thought and

Markets Supervisory Agency Chairman Jusuf Anwar to lead the Jakarta Initiative Task Force); see also Will the
'JakartaInitiative' Succeed, supranote 158 (delineating the general provisions of the Jakarta Initiative).
161. See Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supra note 157 (defining the Task Force under the Jakarta
Initiative); see also Embassy of the United States, Jakarta, Indonesia, supra note 160 (synopsizing the
announcement of the inception of the Jakarta Initiative and its Task Force); see also Will the 'JakartaInitiative,'
supra note 158 (adding IBRA and INDRA will also comprise the membership of the Committee).
162. See The Jakarta Initiative, Implementation (1998) (Indon.) (advocating expedited out-of-court
negotiation is the optimal approach for obtaining settlements); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supranote
157 (providing a brief overview of the Jakarta Initiative); see also New Move on Debt, supra note 159 (implying
despite the lack of legally enforceable results, the Jakarta Initiative should encourage creditors to utilize it because

it provides an increased likelihood of recuperating payment on existing debts).
163. See infia notes 199-206 and accompanying text (discussing INDRA).
164. See The Jakarta Initiative, Implementation (1998) (Indon.) (specifying the Jakarta Initiative is intended
to facilitate the utilization of INDRA); see also Indonesia: Debts: Govt Launches Scheme to Help Out-of-Court
Settlements, INDON. NAT'LNEws AGENCY, Sept. 10,1998 (stating the Jakarta Initiative was devised to complement
the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 1998, as well as the INDRA); see also IndonesianGovt, supranote
155 (implying the Jakarta Initiative, Indra, and the new bankruptcy legislation are intended to supplement one
another in restoring the economy's health).
165. SeeTheJakartaInitiative, Four-Point GovernmentProgram (1998) (Indon.) (delineating the regulation);
seealso Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supranote 157 (providing a brief overview of the provisions ofthe Jakarta
Initiative); see also Will 'JakartaInitiative' Succeed, supra note 158 (highlighting the main terms of the Jakarta

Initiative).
166. See infranotes 168-87 and accompanying text (discussing the substance of each of these standards); see
also The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.); see also Indonesia: "Jakarta
Initiative," supranote 157 (including these standards as principles included within the Jakarta Initiative).
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hope that each will contribute to facilitating the prompt recovery of the Indonesian
economy. 67
a. Organizationand Representation

Debtor-companies should employ the services of a financial advisor who has
experience in corporate and debt restructuring!"s Similarly, the creditors should
form a committee that is representative of all the creditors for that respective debtor
(the "Committee") and designate a chairperson, financial advisor and legal advisor,
all ofwhom should also be experienced in corporate and debt restructuring. '6While

either the debtor or the creditors may commence the restructuring process, the
debtor is to endure all costs incurred by the restructuring and negotiation process,
unless otherwise agreed.1 7' These guidelines will help insure that both the debtor
and creditors are treated fairly, as well as guarantee the wisdom of any decisions

made by the debtor and creditors pertaining to the corporate and debt restructuring
of the debtor.
b. CriticalRole of Senior Management
The Jakarta Initiative advocates how important it is that the debtors and their
Committees involve their
respective senior managers throughout the restructuring
17
and negotiation process. 1

167. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indqn.); see also Indonesia:
"JakartaInitiative," supra note 157 (emphasizing the principles of the Jakarta Initiative as a means towards
negotiations among debtors and creditors with the ultimate result of restoring the Indonesian economy); see also
Will 'JakartaInitiative' Succeed. supra note 160 (criticizing these principles within a skeptical discussion of
whether debt negotiations under the Jakarta Initiative will aid economic recovery).
168. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (providing the requirements
of debt negotiations among debtors and their respective creditors under the Jakarta Initiative); see also Embassy
of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, supra note 162 (delineating the provisions of the Jakarta
Initiative); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supranote 157 (considering the requirements debtors are to
adhere to under the Jakarta Initiative); see also Will 'JakartaInitiative' Succeed, supra note 160 (noting the
implementation of a financial advisor as prerequisite to debt restructuring negotiations pursuant to the Jakarta
Initiative).
169. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (extending the substantive
requirements of "Organization and Representation" under the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "Jakarta
Initiative," supra note 157 (mentioning the need for a Creditors' Committee under the provisions set forth in the
Jakarta Initiative).
170. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998)(Indon.) (presenting the procedure
under which debt restructuring negotiations may commence under the regulation).
171. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (describing the role
management is expected to have in the debt restructuring negotiations pursuant to the regulation); see alsoEmbassy
of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, supra note 162 (listing the general elements of the Jakarta
Initiative); see alsoIndonesia: "JakartaInitiative" on CorporateRestructuring, supranote 159 (stating the Jakarta
Initiative advocates the involvement of the debtors' and creditors' management).
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c. Standstill andInterim Financing
The utilization of standstill and interim financing will guarantee no detrimental
action towards the debtor will be taken while the negotiations transpire. Under the
Jakarta Initiative, all of the creditors of a debtor are encouraged to agree on a
reasonable and finite period of time for a standstill, during which the debtor and
creditors should mutually agree to abide by a set of rules.1 72 These rules are to
govern what actions the debtor and the creditors are able to take while in the
standstill period. 73 Furthermore, the Jakarta Initiative's Four-Point Program
advocates to creditors to subordinate existing claims to any new credit extended to
the debtor once the standstill period begins. 4 This will aid debtors in stimulating
their business and, consequently, help insure the debtor's economic viability.
Finally, creditors are encouraged to either provide the debtor with working capital
during this interim period by extending new credit to the debtor or to yield to other
creditors who are willing to do so. 75
d. Information
Contingent upon both the debtor and creditors signing a confidentiality
agreement, the Jakarta Initiative calls for the debtor to tender current financial
reports to the Committee.' 76 By surrendering such information to the creditors, the
debtor is enabling the creditors to make a financial assessment of the debtor's
economic viability.

172. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (asserting the standards
under which debt restructuring negotiations should transpire); see also Embassy of the United States of America,

Jakarta, Indonesia, supra note 160 (providing a summary of the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "Jakarta
Initiative," supra note 157 (producing the requirements debtors and creditors are to abide by pertaining to
"Standstill and Interim Financing").
173. SeeTheJakartaInitiativeFour-PointGovernmentProgram(1998) (Indon.) (explaining the expectations
for debtors and creditors during the standstill period under the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "Jakarta
Initiative," supra note 157 (summarizing the standards to be adhered to by the debtors and creditors during the

standstill period).
174. SeeTheJakartaInitiative, Four-PointGovernmentProgram (1998) (Indon.) (supplying the requirements
of the Jakarta Initiative pertaining to the standstill period).
175. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) andon.) (stipulating such financing
should be contingent upon the debtor submitting financial reports reflecting satisfactory demonstration of the

company's status and according to agreement between the debtor and creditor).
176. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (clarifying these reports

should provide the Committee with comprehensive information according to internationally acceptable accounting
standards); see also Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, supranote 160 (highlighting the
major provisions of the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supra note 157 (stating a

confidentiality agreement should be signed before debtors relinquish any financial information); see also Will
'JakartaInitiative' Succeed, supranote 158 (asserting the "standstill" period is contingent upon complying with
the informational requirements of the Jakarta Initiative).
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e. Company RestructuringPlan
Under the Jakarta Initiative, the debtor is to devise a restructuring plan and then
submit the plan to the Committee.177 Aside from being consistent with the Jakarta
Initiative's principles, the debtor's plan should reflect the debtor's business plan
and assert financial forecasts.178 The debtor's restructuring plan should consider the
creditors' contractual priorities"' and should be aimed at satisfying the debtor's
debts to restore economic stability.
f

Committee's Advisory Report

The Committee's advisors are responsible for preparing an advisory report,
which includes a review and analysis of the debtor's business operations and future
prospects, as well as recommendations and conclusions as to the viability of the
debtor, the debtor's ability to pay off debt, and the debtor's working capital
requirements for continued existence."ea In order to facilitate the preparation of this
report, the debtor is to cooperate with the Committee's advisors by providing
unencumbered access to the debtor's business and financial records.,
g. Negotiation of a RestructuringPlan
The debtor and the Committee are to enter into negotiations to create an
appropriate restructuring plan for the debtor, using as a foundation for these
negotiations the debtor's restructuring proposal and the Committee's advisory
report."s The resulting restructuring plan is to respect the creditors' previously

177. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (delineating the principles
adopted by the Jakarta Initiative); seealso Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, supranote
160 (reviewing the major facets of the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supranote 157
(outlining the general provisions of the Jakarta Initiative).
178. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (emphasizing the
restiucturing plan "should heed... creditors' contractual priorities, including collateral positions").
179. See id, (discussing the Jakarta Initiatives expectations of debtors in assembling their restructuring plan).
180. See id,
(providing the criteria to be considered by the Creditors' Committee in assessing the economic
status of the debtor).
181. See id. (supplying the Jakarta Initiative's view of expected cooperation from debtors in aiding creditors
to continue negotiations); see also Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, supra note 160
(summarizing the principles adopted by the Jakarta Initiative).
182. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (establishing standards by
which debtors and creditors are to negotiate debt restructuring); see also Embassy of the United States of America,
Jakarta, Indonesia, supra note 160 (reviewing the terms of the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "Jakarta
Initiative," supra note 157 (adding the Creditors' Committee's report should also be utilized to facilitate debt
restructuring negotiations).
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existing contractual obligations, and the plan should not require any party to make
any concessions."
h. Pre-NegotiatedBankruptcy Plans
Once the restructuring negotiations result in an agreed upon plan, "best efforts"
are to be used to insure the plan is disbursed to all creditors whose rights will be
affected by the implementation of the plan.'" Submitting the negotiated plan to the
bankruptcy commercial court may provide relief in the event unanimity among all
of the debtor's creditors is unattainable.1 8 If the commercial court approves the
plan, the negotiated plan becomes binding upon all creditors, including those
18 6
opposed to the negotiated plan's implementation.
i.

Non-Discrimination

The Jakarta Initiative
explicitly states all creditors, domestic and foreign, are
1

to be treated equally. 8

2. The JakartaInitiative Task Force
Under the supervision of the Chairman Indonesia Private-SectorDebt, a Jakarta
Initiative Task Force (the 'Task Force") is to be established.18 8 The Task Force will

183. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (requiring the decisionmaking process to be governed by commercial considerations only).
184. See U (determining how debt restructuring plans are to be implemented); see also Embassy of the
United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, supranote 160 (reciting an overview of the general provisions ofthe
Jakarta Initiative).
185. See Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (establishing the procedure for
addressing disagreements among the debtor and creditors pertaining to the implementation of a negotiated debt
restructuring plan); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supranote 157 (adding that relief may only be sought
from the commercial court if the negotiated restructuring plan complies with the bankruptcy law as amended in

1998).
186. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (determining the rights of
creditors and the enforceability of a plan once a determination is required by the commercial court due to a
disagreement pertaining to the implementation of a negotiated restructuring plan).
187. See id; see alsoEmbassy ofthe United States ofAmerica, Jakarta, Indonesia, supranote 160 (providing
a synopsis of the principles adopted by the Jakarta Initiative). Unfortunately, there seems to be a lack of
commentary on whether or not their was a previously existing problem of discrimination towards foreign creditors.
However, because the Jakarta Initiative explicitly addresses the issue in a separate section, it leads to the conclusion
that such a problem must have existed. See GeoffHiscock, Grim OutlookforDebtRecovery, AUSTRALLAS4iNBUS.
INTEWGENcE, Aug. 5, 1998, at 26 (stating foreign creditors were at a disadvantage because the 1906 bankruptcy
law was applied differently to foreign creditors and that many Australian companies cannot enforce secured debts
held by Indonesian debtors). This makes sense when considered in conjunction with the existence of corruption
throughout the judiciary. See supranotes 68-69 and accompanying text.
188. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (formulating the framework
for the establishment of a Task Force under the Jakarta Initiative); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supra
note 157 (mentioning the creation of the Task Force pursuant to the Jakarta Initiative).
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be comprised of a team that is funded. 89 The Task Force is charged with the duties
of overseeing the expedition of out-of-court negotiations and, where necessary,

provide referrals to the bankruptcy commercial court to either continue restructuring
negotiations under a court-supervised process pursuant to the suspension of
payment clause of the bankruptcy law, or to aid court rulings to adopt out-of-court
settlements and bind all creditors.' 90
3. Regulatory Changes
Under the Jakarta Initiative, the Indonesian government will make necessary
regulatory changes to insure the restructuring negotiations succeed. 191 Additionally,
the Government will be receptive to the recommendations of the Task Force
regarding needed "legal, regulatory or administrative changes."1"
4. CorporateRestructuringAdvisory Committee and Public Participation
The Task Force is also charged with the duty of forming a Corporate
Restructuring Advisory Committee.!" a This Committee is to consist of members
chosen from domestic and foreign banks, Indonesian companies and bondholders. 194
In order to maintain correlation with other governmental policies, a representative

189. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (addressing the
implementation of a Task Force).
190. See id. (listing the duties the Task Force is expected to execute); see also Scott Brede, A Connecticut
FirmJousts with the JakartaInitiative,CONNEF CUTL. Tate., Oct. 26, 1998, at News (summarizing the role of
the Task Force under the Jakarta Initiative); see also Embassy of the United States of America, Indonesia, Jakarta,
supranote 160 (describing the role of the Task Force under the Jakarta Initiative); Indonesia:"JakartaInitiative,"
supra note 157 (identifying the general activities the Task Force is to be involved in).
191. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (including a listing of the
regulations undergoing restructuring at the time of the enactment of the Jakarta Initiative). The other regulations
being restructured at the time of the enactment of the Jakarta Initiative include: (1) Re-evaluation of fixed assets;
(2) Income tax on forgiven loans, or "haircuts;" (3) The use of foreign currency in financial reports; (4) Mergers;
(5) Issuance of shares in different series of categories; (6) Capital increases without preemptive rights; (7)
Repurchase of shares by issuers and public companies; (8) Rights issue, form and content of registration statements,
and prospectuses for a rights issue; (9) Accounting for foreign currency transactions; and (10) Improvements in the
exchange listing rules. The Jakarta Initiative, Restructuring Measures Already Taken (1998) (Indon.); see also
Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative,"supra note 157 (noting the Jakarta Initiative provides for the government reforming
any other necessary regulatory changes). But this is the extent to which the government is willing to be involved.
See infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the government will only provide the legislative framework
for negotiations and will not help the private sector by absorbing some of the debt, as this would only be reflected
in an increase of taxes).
192. The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.).
193. See id. (construing the creation and duties of the Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee); see also
Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supra note 157 (outlining the main principles enacted by the Jakarta Initiative).
194. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (determining the
composition of the Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee; see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supra
note 157 (adding IBRA and INDRA are also to participate on the Committee).
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from IBRA 95 and INDRA shall also be a member of the Committee.19 The
Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee's role is to evaluate the effectiveness
of the Jakarta Initiative and propose new approaches which assist in its

implementation. 9 The Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee is therefore
required to meet on a regular basis and report to and consult with the Task Force.
Furthermore, the Task Force will seek public participation by conferring with the
legal and8financial communities, as well as representatives of labor and consumer
19
groups.
C. IndonesianDebt RestructuringProgram
The Indonesian government maintains a desire to remain neutral.1 9 This
requires the government to limit the extent of its involvement in the salvation of the
private sector's economic viability in establishing a legislative framework through
which debtors and creditors can negotiate. Specifically, the government of
Indonesia has only participated by passing and implementing the new bankruptcy
law and the Jakarta Initiative. Pursuant to the terms set forth by the IMF in
exchange for a loan, the Indonesian government founded INDRA.2r
The Indonesian Debt Restructuring Program (INDRA) was instituted in August,
1998, to provide debtors with foreign currency at a pre-determined exchange rateP'

195. The IBRA is the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency. See supra note 105. As part of the plan
submitted to the IMF in exchange for a loan, Indonesia created this agency. See Pate & Andrews, supranote 5, at
21. IBRA is a restructuring agency and has the autonomous power to liquidate those banks severely troubled and
to restructure others, as well as to privatize some banks while merging others. See il Pursuant to the formulation
of IBRA, a total of ten insolvent banks were closed from April to August, 1998. See Riyadi, supra note 77.
Subsequently, the Indonesian government decided to aid in the recapitalizing of undercapitalized banks as an
alternative approach. See id
196. The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (establishing the composition
of the Committee); see also Indonesia: "JakartaInitiative," supranote 157 (considering the establishment of the
Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee).
197. SeeThe Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.) (providing the duties of the
Corporate Restructuring Advisory Committee under the Jakarta Initiative).
198. See id. (delineating how the Corporate Advisory Restructuring Committee is to execute its duties).
199. See Indonesian Govt, supra note 155 (stating "[p]rivate offshore debts must be settled without the
involvement of the government"); see also IndonesianBailout of Private Debts to Burden Taxpayers: WB, ASIA
PULSE, Nov. 3, 1998, at Nationwide Financial News (asserting the government will not assume any of the debt on
behalf of Indonesian debtors and that any settlements arrived at must be the result of negotiations between the
debtor and the respective creditors).
200. See supranotes 94-122 and accompanying text (delineating the role of the IMF and the agreement given
by Indonesia in exchange for monetary support).
201. See Christine Tjandraningsih, Indonesia to Launch New Initiative to Solve Debt, JAPAN ECON.
NnwswnF, Sept. 9,1998 (adding INDRA is the result of a private debt agreement devised in Frankfurt, Germany,
in June 1998). The Bank Indonesia is responsible for the supervision of this government institution. See id.; see
also Creditors'Keen to RenegotiateDebts,' THEJAKARTAPoST, Oct. 15, 1998, at 8 (discussing the issue of debtors
and their respective creditors negotiating on debt restructuring); see also New Move on Debt, supra note 162
(suggesting the low value of the rupiah has served as a deterrent for utilization of INDRA).
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in order to avoid the risk of any further devaluation of the rupiah.? INDRA is an
Indonesian government plan intended to encourage foreign creditors to restructure
the loans they hold with Indonesian debtors.203 It was implemented with
encouragement from the IMF' In order to benefit from INDRA, debtors and
creditors must agree to a debt restructuring plan covering an eight year pay-back

period, including a three year grace period.2 An additional requirement is that
debtors must register with INDRA by July 30, 1999.26
D. Other Regulations
Aside from the three broad areas in which the Indonesian government has
enacted new legislation, many other regulations have been either revised or newly

created in an effort to facilitate the restructuring of Indonesia's corporate sector.2 7

202. See Thoenes, supranote 66 (stating INDRA provides those debtors and creditors who can agree on an
eight year rescheduling of debt with an assurance of protection against the risk of any further devaluation of the
rupiah); cf New Move on Debt, supranote 162 (suggesting the low value of the rupiah has served as a deterrent
for utilization of INDRA).
203. See supranote 201 and accompanying.text (expounding the inception of INDRA); see also Thoenes,
supra note 66 (affirming the Indonesian government contrived INDRA in an effort to instigate negotiations between
debtors and their respective creditors on rescheduling of debts).
204. See supranote 105 and accompanying text (discussing financial sector reform); see alsoThoenes, supra
note 66 (implying INDRA should have been more popular among debtors and creditors because of its backing by
the IMF).
205. See Companies Nearing Agreement on S10b Debt Restructuring, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 23, 1998
(explaining INDRA was launched by the Indonesian government in August, 1998, as a technique to aid insolvent
debtors and their respective creditors); see also supranote 201-02 and accompanying text (providing the terms and
purpose of INDRA); see also Success of Foreign Debt Relief Hingeson Domestic Debt, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 27,
1998 (adding that during the three-year grace period the debtor only pays interest and an insolvent debtor has yet
to employ INDRA). Debtors and creditors who seek to employ INDRA must first agree on an eight-year
rescheduling of debt plan and may utilize the Jakarta Initiative to so. See supranotes 201-02 and accompanying
text (scrutinizing the INDRA); see also Literatureon JakartaInitiative,supranote 156 (clarifying the interaction
of the Jakarta Initiative with INDRA).
206. See No Indonesian Co Has Joined Govt's Debt Settlement Program,ASIA PULSE, Jan. 29, 1999, at
Nationwide Financial News (claiming as of January 29,1999, not one debtor had registered with INDRA and that
the registration deadline will not be extended); see also Indonesian Debt Agency Sets Exchange Rate at Rp7,
8151US$), ASIA PULSE, Feb. 4, 1999 (asserting many debtors are expressing interest in INDRA).
207. See supra note 191 and accompanying text; see also The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government
Program (1998) (Indon.) (describing the regulations involving re-evaluation of fixed assets, income tax on forgiven
loans, use of foreign currency in financial reports, mergers, issuance of shares in different series of categories,
capital increases without preemptive rights, repurchase of shares by issuers and public companies, rights issue,
accounting for foreign currency transactions, and improvements in the exchange listing rules); see generally 199798 in Indonesia, supra note 1 (mentioning expected reform addressing the banking industry); see generallyFaith
Keenan et al., Banking: Last Resort, FAR E. EcoN. REy., Dec. 17, 1998, at Business (exploring the problems
encountered in the efforts to reform the Indonesian banking industry); seegenerallyKrider, supranote 2 (discussing
mutual funds and the need for Indonesian legislative reform on transparency); see generally Arshad A. Ahmed,
Comment, IntroducingAsset Securitization to Indonesia:A Method In Madness, 19 U. PA. J. IT'L EcON. L. 823
(1998) (evaluating the enactment of an asset securitization law in response to the Asian financial crisis); see
generally Lichtenstein, supra note 95 (exploring the correlation between the bank regulatory structure and the
currency crises in emerging markets).
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Due to the recent enactment of these regulations, implementation remains hazy.
It appears as though all who are involved, the debtors, creditors and the
government, are acting with uncertainty and are unsure what will ultimately happen.
To complicate the situation further, everyone has a different idea of how this
predicament should be handled. ° With this, two consistent attitudes strongly
permeate every aspect of this transitory period: the government wants to remain
uninvolved 2°9 and both the debtors and creditors are wary and suspicious of the
judiciary.210
A.

The Bankruptcy Proceedings

To date, titilization of the new bankruptcy law has been infrequent. Although
one reason cannot be ascertained to explain this, several theories exist which confer
validation.
First and foremost, those who would employ the new bankruptcy law have
admitted to being hesitant towards the new court.21 Prior to the enactment of the
2 12
new law, the Indonesian judiciary suffered from a reputation of corruption.

208. See World Bank Takes Dim View of IMF Measures, STAi TRIB., Dec. 3, 1998, at ID (reporting the

World Bank believes the IMF and the United States fumbled the initial handling of the Asian financial crisis and
points out the continuing debate of whether their decisions furthered the impact of the crisis). The IMF chose not
to issue a statement regarding the World Bank's findings, but has been cited as validating portions of the report
Id However, the IM claims its decision to effect raising interest rates in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea
was the right choice and has been effective. Id; see also CreditorsInsistDebtors Sell Noncore Businesses, supra
note 92 (demonstrating how creditors are demanding debtors illustrate their ability to generate cashflow before
entering into debt restructuring negotiations); see also Kagda,supra note 137 (highlighting the adverse opinions
on whether banks should provide debt write-offs for their debtors); see also Sanger, supra note 15 (providing a
summary of a report prepared by the World Bank which concludes tle IMF and United States made several
"misjudgments" which had severe consequences for the Asian countries); see also David E. Sanger, World Bank
Beats Breastfor Failuresin Indonesia,N.Y. "IMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A14 (highlighting the adverse views of the
IMFand World Bank versus those of the Indonesian government); cf.InternationalReports:Indonesia, WorldBank
Gives Approval, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A14 (asserting the World Bank's approval of the implementation
and effectiveness of the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
209. See supranote 199 (illustrating the government's attitude to remain nonpartisan); see also infra note
249 (considering the Indonesian government's attitude towards private foreign debt).
210. See supranotes 67-69 (exploring the disillusioned attitudes of Indonesians towards its judiciary).
211. See generallyBankFximRejects Court'sDecision on BankruptcyRuling, JAKARTA POST, Nov.21, 1998
(describing a commercial court decision not to hear a case because the bankruptcy claim "lacked 'simplicity'").
212. See Indonesian Bankruptcy Law-2: Avoid Bentoel Scenarios, supra note 41 (asserting the judicial
system is corrupt and, consequently, prevents the utilization of the bankruptcy law); see also McCarthy, supranote
66 (arguing justice under the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code relied on who paid the judge the most amount of
money); cf. Achmadi & Trommel, supranote 24 (suggesting the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code did not need
reformation, but rather the administration of justice did); cf Thoenes, supra note 66 (implying bribery is
commonplace in Indonesia and, because the Indonesian judiciary is under paid, it too is susceptible to such
egregious practices). Granted this attitude reflects the views of the Indonesian population prior to the enactment
of the new law, but there is not any new evidence to support a change in the operation of the judiciary, or more
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Similarly, the previous inefficiency of the judiciary appears to have carried over
into the commercial court.2 3 Another reason why the new bankruptcy law has not
been more frequently employed is founded in the cultural tendency of the

Indonesian people, to avoid confrontation. 2t4 Furthermore, with an astronomical
insolvency level,21 5 utilization of the bankruptcy law as a resolution would virtually
require taking every Indonesian business to court.216 Finally, debtors are eager to
avoid settling their insolvency pursuant to the newly amended bankruptcy law
because it is so heavily weighed in favor of creditors.21 7 This supports why the
Jakarta Initiative has proved to be the more popular means for confronting this
issue.218
An additional reason that minimizes the popularity of the new bankruptcy law
is that the new law only applies to general creditors.21 9 Depending on how many
creditors are secured creditors, the new bankruptcy law may prove to be virtually
useless, as these creditors are left with the remedies provided by the district court
pursuant to the original bankruptcy law.m Complicating this further is the fact that
the judiciary lacks the confidence and trust of the Indonesian people.2'

specifically, to the new commercial court; or in the opinion of the Indonesian people. Therefore, it is likely the
Indonesian people have transferred this attitude onto the new bankruptcy court.
213. See IndonesianBusiness. A Survival Guide, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 59 (asserting it is virtually
impossible to force the liquidation of a debtor's estate and those who have attempted to do so have been caught up
in lengthy appeals).
214. See Achmadi & Trommel, supranote 24 (adding the inefficient judiciary also serves as a reason why
the original bankruptcy law was not used). Although the context of this article was in reference to the original
insolvency law, no reason exists as to why it can not equally apply to the Indonesian people following the
enactment of the new bankruptcy law.
215. See supra note 93 (discussing the insolvency levels throughout Indonesia).
216. See Grainne McCarthy, Deluge of Cases Expected, supra note 127 (explaining why the 1998
amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code will be ineffective); cf. Thoenes, supra note 66 (concluding the
commercial court does not have enough personnel to be able to service all of the insolvent companies).
217. See Riyadi & Unditu, supranote 148 (observing the procedure through which a petition for bankruptcy
may be filed and how easily a debtor may be deemed bankrupt); see also supranotes 126-54 and accompanying
text (examining the bankruptcy law pursuant to the 1998 amendments). But see Keenan et al., supra note 207
(claiming the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code have proved ineffectual because the
commercial court is demonstrating a tendency to favor the debtor's positioning).
218. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (noting the response to the Jakarta Initiative); see also
infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text (expounding the positive response to the Jakarta Initiative).
219. See supranote 136 and accompanying text (discussing the limited application of the new law to general
creditors only).
220. See supranotes 42, 138.44 and accompanying text (explaining the effect ofbankruptcy on the debtor's
estate under the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code and the 1998 amendments). Under the original bankruptcy law,
the district court could provide the creditor with a lien over the debtor's property. However, due to the corruption
and other problems existing under the original law, it was rarely utilized. See supranotes 65-71 and accompanying
text (postulating why the 1906 Indonesian Bankruptcy Code was not utilized). Consequently, this is likely to be
the continued attitude and secured creditors are likely to be left without a remedy.
221. See supranotes 8 and accompanying text (developing the corruptness of the Indonesian judiciary).

384

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 12
B. The JakartaInitiative

Under the Jakarta Initiative, the negotiation of a restructuring plan should
transpire through an "expeditious process" in order to minimize the adverse effects

market uncertainty might have on the debtor.m
On November 3 -4, 1998, the Jakarta Initiative conference transpired, at which
approximately 1,200 Indonesian debtors congregated, attempting to negotiate the
country's extensive private debt.m23 The Jakarta Initiative Task Force arranged the
conference in an effort to encourage debtors and creditors to come together and

settle on out-of-court restructuring plans. m
Despite the enthusiasm for the concept of the Jakarta Initiative, the conference
highlighted the existence of difficulties, which may encumber the successful
implementation.'

Included among these is how to value debtors' assets and the

creditors' requirement of how the debtor proposes to survive the economic crisis.
Additionally, Indonesian debtors are seeking debt write-offs, ' 7 but creditors are not
receptive to this.'

Conversely, creditors require that Indonesian corporations sell

222. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.).
223. See Conference on Debt Begins, supra note 159 (determining the large number of participants was
indicative of the receptive attitude of both debtors and creditors to the Jakarta Initiative); see also Reiner, supra note
94 (stating the purpose of the conference was to persuade debtors and creditors to negotiate a restructuring of debt);
see also Tedjasukmana, supra note 86 (explaining the World Bank and the Indonesian Government arranged the
conference as an effort to advocate the utilization of out-of-court alternatives to bankruptcy in restructuring debts).
224. See, e.g., Bakrie Looks to Debt Restructuring Deal, THE JAKARTA PosT, Nov. 3,1998, at News.
225. See generally Creditors Insist Debtors SellNoncore Businesses, supra note 92 (discussing the creditors'
prerequisite debtors being able to demonstrate the ability to generate cash-flow to entering debt restructuring
negotiations); see generally Indonesian Debtors, Japan Creditors Continue Talks, AsiA PuLsE, Nov. 4, 1998, at
National Financial News (claiming the diversity of industries impedes wide-scale negotiations); see generally
Reiner, supra note 92 (discussing the adverse opinions on how assets should be valued); see generally Kagda,supra
note 137 (exploring the opposing views on whether the banks should write-off portions of the debt owed by
Indonesian debtors).
226. See Reiner, supra note 92 (asserting future value of assets is essential to any restructuring settlement).
But note, the Jakarta Initiative requires the debtor to delineate this. See The Jakarta Initiative, Four-Point
Government Program (1998) (Indon.).
227. See Kagda,supra note 137 (evaluating whether portions of debt should be written-off by creditors).
228. See Tedjasukmana, supra note 86 (explaining the World Bank is against debt write-offs because they
weigh so heavily in favor of debtors). This demand is problematic because the Jakarta Initiative specifies neither
side is to be forced into making concessions during the negotiation of a restructuring plan. See Jakarta Initiative,
Four-Point Government Program (1998) (Indon.). Although, from the debtor's perspective, such a demand is a
"commercial consideration" it also borders on the side of unfair bargaining power. If the debtors refuse to negotiate
with their creditors unless debt write-offs will be provided, then the debtors' creditors are either forced to make a
concession or to terminate negotiations with the debtor. If the latter approach is opted for, then everybody is back
at square one. If the creditors are general creditors, then they may seek relief through the new bankruptcy law.
However, if the creditors are secured creditors, then the only relief available is through the traditional court system,
which is virtually useless because of the corruption and inefficiency that has permeated the traditional courts. See
supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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subsidiary businesses in order to stimulate cash flow.' The inherent problem with
this is that the sale of Indonesian debtors' subsidiary businesses in the current
Indonesian market conditions would result in severely skewing the situation in
favor of the creditors. ° Crucial to the successful implementation of the Jakarta
Initiative is honest disclosure by Indonesian debtors.2 1

V. EFFECrMIVE

S

A consequence of any new regulation is the reality that the effectiveness may
only be judged in hindsight. Consequently, the effectiveness of these new
regulations cannot possibly be gauged with any real insight. Rather, the following
section provides the various attitudes and theories which currently exist from which
limited conclusions can be drawn. Despite this caveat, however, some certainties
do appear to be emerging. Specifically, the popularity of the Jakarta Initiative is
difficult to deny, just as the less embraced bankruptcy law is most likely doomed.

To date, a great deal of speculation remains as to whether the new regulations will
be effective and adequate. 2 Critics already forecast amendments to the new
regulations, 3 while advocates claim it is too soon to make a determination either

229. See CreditorsInsist Debtors Sell Noncore Businesses, supra note 92 (postulating the relinquishment
of subsidiary business was a prerequisite to creditors' agreement to engage in restructuring negotiations through
the Jakarta Initiative). Specifically, creditors believe the aggressive horizontal expansion pursued during the
prosperous part of the 1990s has left Indonesian companies inefficient. Id. Consequently, foreign creditors are under
the impression that if Indonesian companies sell off the subsidiary portions of their companies, the liquidation of
unnecessary assets will quickly generate cash flow while simultaneously produce money to pay off debts. la
230. See CreditorsInsist DebtorsSell Noncore Businesses,supranote 92 (advocating this course of action
could only be feasible if creditors agree to utilize future value); see also Khanna, supranote 92 (illustrating the
effect of the devaluation of the rupiah on the market value of Indonesian assets); see also Reiner, supranote 92
(exploring the impact of devalued assets on debt negotiations).
231. See Indonesian Debtors,JapanCreditorsContinue Talks, supra note 225 (referring to the Chairman
of Indonesian Private Banks Association assertion that honest disclosure to creditors is useful information that will
facilitate creditors' decisions throughout the negotiation process); see also Reiner, supranote 92 (explaining past
disclosure from Indonesian debtors was insufficient). Full disclosure from creditors is essential to restoring
creditors' confidence in the Indonesian economy. See id. Although debtors are sympathetic to the creditors' need
of full disclosure, the continuing existence of economic instability prevents debtors from providing forecasts
demonstrating how the debtors intend to survive. Id.; see also Conference on Debt Begins, supranote 159 (quoting
the Indonesian Minister for Economy, Finance, and Industry that failure to provide full disclosure undermines the
trust that is essential for settlement among debtors and creditors).
232. See generally Borsuk & Casey, supra note 147 (concluding the strengths of the insolvency law as
amended are significant, but may be overshadowed by wide-spread scepticism); see also Can BankruptcyLaw Solve
Debt Problem?,supra note 121 (concluding the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code as amended in 1998 is adequate to
effectively address insolvency, but that the administration of justice serves as a significant obstacle).
233. See Keenan et al., supra note 207 (declaring "... . the bankruptcy and foreclosure laws needed to
facilitate debt restructuring either don't exist or have proved ineffectual"); see also Sender, supra note 159;
compare Thoenes, supranote 68 (quoting a banker, "[t]he bankruptcy court is not working... [t]here has to be
political pressure for it to work").

386

The TransnationalLawyer/Vol. 12

way.23 Many are of the opinion that the enactment of a new bankruptcy law will not
provide a solution2 5' as the real task lies with addressing and remedying the
"bankruptcy of law."
With few cases filed under the new laws and a minute amount resulting in a
bankrupt adjudication, creditors are cautious of the newly established commercial
court' a7 One weakness of the commercial court is its inability to adequately grasp
and deal with the complexities and terminology of international finance.2 8 Those
who have attempted resolution of insolvency under the new law have encountered
irreconcilable judgements or have been immersed in court appeals.2 9 Much of the
criticism and inconsistencies among rulings, however, are due to the novelty of the
commercial court and are likely to dissipate as the nuances of the new law are

234. See Going Bankrupt, supra note 139; Indonesia: Only 5 Cases Brought to Court Under New Law,
INDON. NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 15, 1998; see also Alastair McIndoe, IMF/Neiss/Indonesia-3: Cautious
Optimism Over Econ Outlook, Dow JONS NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 13, 1998; cf Indonesia World Bank Gives
Approval,NAT'LLAWJ., Nov. 16,1998, at A14 (quoting the head of the World Bank's corporate restructuring and
governance group that despite the criticism early rulings received the new bankruptcy law is evidently working).
235. See generallyMichael Shari, GettingOut From Under,BUs. WK., Feb. 1, 1999, at 28 (stating Indonesia
lacks a"... sound legal structure and a credible bankruptcy system").
real problem in Indonesia is not bad law, but
236. See Achmadi & Trommel, supranote 24 (asserting "It]he
the inefficient administration of justice"); see also Can Bankruptcy Law Solve Debt Problem?, supra note 121
(claiming the judiciary is in need of reformation itself). According to a survey conducted by the American
Bankruptcy Institute, a fundamental objective of any bankruptcy law should be to either provide a "fresh start" for
the debtor, or to maximize the amount of the debtor's assets distributed to the respective creditors. See Achmadi
& Trommel, supra note 24. Indonesia's original Bankruptcy Code had met this criteria, and thus, should not
necessarily have been discarded. Id. This becomes more apparent when considered in conjunction with the
effectiveness of the 1998 amendments to date. See supra notes 211-21 and accompanying text (describing the
deficiencies of the 1998 amendments to the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
237. See Dan Murphy, Companies: Astra'sRocky Road: CarMaker Tries to Extract Itself From Mountain
of Debt,FARE. ECON. REV., Dec. 17,1998, at 51 (stating bankers are ofthe opinion that the new commercial court
lacks the influence to challenge massive companies, due to their political and economic influence); seealso Riyadi
& Unditu, supra note 148 (expressing concern over the fact that the commercial court's judges are the same judges
from thejudiciary with a reputation ofcorruption); see also Tedjasukamna, supra note 86 (explaining that the effect
of only two cases resulting in bankruptcy, of the twelve filed, indicates the lack of receptiveness to the new
commercial court); see also Thoenes, supranote 66 (observing the unfavorable response of lawyers and bankers);
see generally Commercial Court Needs Modernization,JAKARTA PosT, Jan. 29, 1999, at News (outlining the
reasons for skepticism towards the commercial court). But cf. Indonesia World Bank Gives Approval, supranote
234 (challenging that despite the criticism of early decisions, the new bankruptcy law is evidently working).
238. See Commercial Court Needs Modernization, supra note 236 (asserting inconsistencies among
commercial court rulings are due to the lack of effective and efficient means to cope with modem finance).
Fortunately, these inadequacies can be rectified with time and more experience for the commercial court and its
judges. Id Whether creditors will exert the required patience and faith in the new system remains an unanswered
question. If the creditors' skepticism is validated for too much longer, it is likely these creditors will lose all
confidence in the ability of the new court to provide a sufficient remedy. Consequently, the new law may be facing
abandonment and idleness.
the same fate as the last:
239. See Indonesian Business. A Survival Guide, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 58; see also Court

Overturns ModernlandBankruptcyRuling, ASLAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1998 (scrutinizing the rationale behind the
Indonesian Supreme Court's decision to overturn a bankruptcy adjudication); see also Thoenes, supra note 66
(reviewing various decisions under the new law and their implications, including the reversal of two of three
bankruptcy declarations that have occurred under the 1998 amendments to the bankruptcy law).
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forged through.24 Furthermore, creditors have expressed that they consider

utilization of bankruptcy to be a course of last resort.2 "
Similarly, INDRA has also suffered from a high amount of criticism. Most
notably, many are discontent with the current value of the rupiah and do not want
to be locked into such a low currency exchange rate. 2 Additionally, pursuant to the
terms of INDRA, the debtor is required to pay interest and a percentage of the
principle amount of the debt owed to creditors immediately.2 3 Finally, the
successful implementation of INDRA relies on creditors writing off significant
portions of debt. 2 "
Currently, speculation concludes that the Jakarta Initiative is the best solution
available to Indonesian debtors with debts owing to foreign creditors.24s Favoritism
lies with the Jakarta Initiative because it is viewed as a "win-win" solution for both
debtors and creditors. 246 Additionally, the Jakarta Initiative provides for a settlement

240. See generally Court Turns Down Claim Against DharmalaAgrifood, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 8, 1998
(emphasizing the jurisdictional limitations created by the new law as they applied to specific cases); see generally
JakartaCourtRejects IFCBankruptcyClaimAgainstDharmala,supranote 142 (highlighting a significant change
the new law brought about and the confusion this change created in a specific case when a creditor filed petition
against its debtor).
241. See Kagda, supranote 137 (citing the statements of a vice-president of the Amro Bank who claimed use
of the bankruptcy court was the "least attractive option"); see also Achmadi & Trommel, supranote 24 (explaining
the Indonesian culture is non-confrontational and thus, the bankruptcy law is avoided as a means of settling
outstanding debts).
242. See Thoenes, supra note 66 (claiming the value of the rupiah correlates with the amount of interest
debtors exert towards INDRA); see generally IndonesiaDebtAgency Sets ExchangeRate at Rp7,815/US$1, supra
note 206 (implying more debtors are interested in INDRA due to the higher currency exchange rate available).
243. See Thoenes, supra note 66 (providing the difficulties debtors and creditors face in attempting to
negotiate restructuring plans for debt).
244. SeeRILacksErpertsforNewBankruptcyLaw,supranote41(clarifying any debt write offs by creditors
would be in.
addition to the eight-year rescheduling of payment period). Creditors have expressed resistance and
discontent with the notion of writing off any of the existing debt. See e.g.,Kagda, supranote 137 (demonstrating
creditors' attitude towards writing off existing debt).
245. See Creditors Believe Jakarta Initiative the Best Option: Banker, ASiA PULsE, Nov. 4, 1998, at
Nationwide Financial News (asserting that patience from both creditors and debtors is vital to the success of the
Jakarta Initiative); see also Brede, supranote 190 (arguing Indonesia needs an out-of-court method through which
debts can be repaid without the liquidation of assets and that the Jakarta Initiative is comprised of "... the 'best'
parts of different bankruptcy systems around the world" ); see also Indonesian Govt, supranote 155 (including a
statement by the Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry that the Jakarta Initiative is an integral
aspect of economic recovery); see generally Conference on Debt Begins, supra note 159 (emphasizing the
importance of out-of-court settlements among debtors and creditors to restoring the Indonesian economy's health);
see generally Indonesian Business. A Survival Guide, supra note 239 (outlining what one Indonesian firm
underwent to restructure its debt pursuant to the Jakarta Initiative); see generallyShari, Getting Out From Under,
supra note 235 (asserting debt restructuring [under the Jakarta Initiative] is necessary in light of the inadequate
bankruptcy law).
246. See IndonesianGovt, supra note 155 (advocating the framework of the Jakarta Initiative enables both
parties to attain their respective goals while promoting good working relationships between debtor and creditor);
see also Indonesian Debtors,Japan CreditorsContinue Talks, supra note 225 (quoting the Chairman of the
Indonesian Private Banks Association that restructuring of debts through negotiations should produce "win-win"
results for both creditors and debtors).
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that allows for bankruptcy to be avoided.27 Avoiding bankruptcy and restructuring

debt out of court will minimize job elimination in indebted companies.m The
Jakarta Initiative is also preferred as the means for debt restructuring because it
removes the government from the process.2 9

Critics of the Jakarta Initiative assert that the initiative will only result in further
negotiations without any sort of settlement if the Jakarta Initiative does not include
some repercussion for failing to settle.m° Furthermore, the Indonesian government
is of the opinion that foreign creditors will have to alleviate some of the debt owed
by the Indonesian private sector through
debt write-offs.25t Yet, foreign banks have
252

not been responsive to this concept.

As of mid-December, 1998, Indonesia appears to be far from the road to
recovery.2 3 For instance, Indonesia is still experiencing high inflation and

247. See IndonesianGovt, supranote 155 (recognizing the avoidance ofbankruptcy permits debtors to regain
strength and competitiveness); see also Brede, supranote 190 (outlining the goals and structure of the Jakarta
Initiative).
248. See Reiner S., supranote 92 (setting forth the fact that resorting to the bankruptcy court will result in
the loss of jobs); see also Conference on Debt Begins, supra note 159 (implying the future stability of the
Indonesian economy relies on long-term financial security of debtors).
249. See Indonesia Bailout of Private Debts to Burden Taxpayers: WB, ASIA PuLsE, Nov. 3, 1998, at
Nationwide Financial News (maintaining that once the government establishes the framework through which
debtors and creditors negotiate, the government's role is complete). If the government were to help pay debtors'
debts, the ultimate result would be an increase in taxes. l This undesirable result can be avoided by requiring those
who procured the debt to repay it through the utilization of the Jakarta Initiative. Id.; see also Indonesian Govt,
supranote 155 (restricting the government's involvement in the restructuring of debt to developing the framework
for negotiations).
250. See Tedjasukmana,supranote 86 (arguing debtors have an incentive to drag out the negotiation process
while vying for a better currency exchange rate).
251. See Kagda, supranote 137 (quoting Dono Iskandar Joyosubrote, an adviser to INDRA).
252. See id, (explaining banks are hesitant to provide debt write-offs because debtors have not been
reasonable in negotiations and the decision to give a debtor a debt write-off would depend on the debtor's cash-

flow).
253. See 1997-98 In Indonesia, supra note 1 (noting the Indonesian government expects an economic
contraction in all major sectors); seealso Crisis-HitCountriesNeedMore PoliticalPower,BUS. DAY (THAIL.), Jan.
25, 1998, at Business (concluding full economic recovery relies on political stability and dedication to economic
reform); see also Bruce Einhorn et al., Report Cardon Asia, Bus. WK., Nov. 23, 1998, at 24 (giving Indonesia a
'D' in terms of restructuring the corporate sector and declaring it is "still a disaster area" overall); see also
Indonesia:Section L Country Assessment, PERC COUNTRY RISK REP., Jan. (1999) (maintaining that despite the
recovery of the currency exchange rate and reduction of inflation, the political unrest continues to threaten the
economic stability of Indonesia); see also Eddy Soeparno, Is the Indonesian Economic Recovery for Real?,THE

JAKARTA PosT, Dec. 22, 1998 (stating that Indonesia will not acquire economic stability until
investors.., repatriate capital back into the country in the form of productive investments"). But see Janet
Guttsman, Indonesia, ThailandReceive FreshLoansfrom IMF, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 17, 1998 (observing progress
towards economic stability in Indonesia has been mixed and that the IMF demonstrates less certitude towards
Indonesia than the other Asian countries affected by the crisis); cf. IMF Oks $1B for Indonesia, AP ONLINE,
Dec. 15, 1998 (explaining the IM has loaned Indonesia an additional US$957 million due to the country's progress
toward economic stabilization and has agreed to continue lending funds provided Indonesia sustains its progress).
'...
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unemployment. 254 Furthermore, gross domestic product fell fifteen percent in 1998,
and it is predicted to continue falling throughout 1999.2 5 Additionally, many

contend the economy will not stabilize until political modifications transpire.m
VI. CONCLUSION
In response to the wide-spread insolvency throughout Indonesia, the
government responded, with the prompting of the IMF, to undertake reformation
of the nearly century-old Indonesian Bankruptcy Code. 2s7 Resulting from this
undertaking were three regulations sharing the same goal: restoration of a stable

economy.

With less than a year passing since the enactment of these three

regulations, conclusive determinations about their respective effectiveness and
viability remains ambiguous.0 9 However, the Jakarta Initiative appears to be
emerging at the forefront as the favorite means for addressing the issue of
insolvency with Indonesian debtors and their respective creditors. 2 °
The Jakarta Initiative looks as though both the debtors and creditors accept it.
Although many issues still exist pertaining to its implementation, debtors and their

254. See ForAsia,The Worst May Be Over, Ci. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1998, at 18 (stating as of mid-December,
inflation was reported at eighty percent); see also Michael Richardson, Prospects of a Recovery Brighten for
Indonesia, INT'L HERALDTRIB., Nov. 2, 1998 (claiming interest rates are too high for anyone to borrow); see also
Philip Segal, Risk of Social Crisis Rising in Asia, UN Agency Finds,INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 2, 1998, at I
(asserting the unemployment rate has skyrocketed to fifteen percent from five percent in one year).
255. See Yearender:Asian Economies Seek Recovery Through Reforms, supranote 86 (forecasting economic
growth in Indonesia will be negative six to eight percent for 1999); see also Riyadi, RI Economy in Deep Water,
andIt's
Sink orSwm Time, supranote 77 (evaluating the economic predicament of Indonesia and concluding "[t]he
country's economy remains a near hopeless case").
256. See Briefing of the InternationalEconomic Policy, Export and Trade Subcommittee of the Senate
ForeignRelations Committee, FED.NEWS SERVIcE, Jan. 27, 1999, at In the News (remarking economic growth
cannot occur until Indonesia can establish a sound government); see also Einhom et al., supranote 253 (postulating
the recovery of the economy will remain delayed until elections in May, 1999 because of the association of
President Habibie to President Suharto, which fuels the risk of political chaos); see also Maclntyre, supra note 1
(describing the dependency of the economy on Indonesia's political situation); see also Riyadi. supra note 77
(asserting the return to economic stability is directly related to the political health of Indonesia); see also Yearender:
Asian Economies Seek Recovery Through Reforms, supra note 86 (claiming most analysts assert Indonesia's
economic recovery relies on political stability and attribute the resignation of President Suharto to the economic
crisis). But see, Reform is Crucial,ASIAWEEK, Jan. 8, 1998, at 66 (reflecting the Indonesian government has
proceeded towards resolving the deficiencies within the banking industry, notwithstanding the volatile political
condition).
257. See supra notes 65-93 and accompanying text (providing the historical framework for the need for
insolvency reformation).
258. See supra notes 72-122 (describing how wide-spread insolvency permeated Indonesia and the
requirements the IMF presented as an exchange for monetary support).
259. See supra notes 232-56 and accompanying text (describing the effectiveness of the respective

regulations).
260. See supranotes 245-49 and accompanying text (illustrating the strengths and receptive responses iothe
Jakarta Initiative).
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respective creditors are beginning to reach mutual agreements of how to restructure
debts under the Jakarta Initiative."sl
Although a gallant effort has been made to formulate an insolvency law that is
efficient, fair, and employed, Indonesia appears to have failed. 2m Substantively, the
1998 amendments appear to be adequate to achieve their intended purpose.'
However, one important element is missing that is vital to the insurance of any
law's success, and that is the trust and confidence of the people who use the law. 264
Furthermore, those who have employed the insolvency law are still finding
themselves without quick results and tied up in lengthy appeals.' Until Indonesia
addresses these deficiencies, it is unlikely any law will be widely utilized.266
Similarly, INDRA currently faces doom. 7 For one thing, debtors and their
creditors are just now beginning to come to mutual agreement as to how debts

should be restructured under the Jakarta Initiative.

A prerequisite to enjoying the

benefits under INDRA, however, is that debtors and creditors agree to an eight year

restructuring plan.'

Debtors and creditors have been unable to reach such

agreements so far because they have not been able to take advantage of INDRA. 270
Furthermore, the registration deadline of July 30, 1999 is looming, and if debtors
plan on employing INDRA they better decide and commit themselves soon. 21

261. See generally IndonesianBusiness. A Survival Guide, supra note 239 (discussing the settlement with
the creditors of an Indonesian company); Shari, supranote 235 (mentioning some of the successful negotiations
completed and underway).
262. See generally supranotes 237.41 (explaining the weaknesses ofthe 1998 amendments to the Indonesian
Bankruptcy Code).
263. See supranotes 126-54 and accompanying text (delineating the provisions of the 1998 amendments to
the Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
264. See supranotes 68,211-14 (arguing the Indonesianjudiciary is corrupt and, thus, dissuades pcople from
utilizing the bankruptcy law).
265. See IndonesianBusiness.A SurvivalGuide,supranote 239 (stating creditors are still finding it virtually
impossible to force the liquidation of a debtor's estate, despite the enactment of the 1998 amendments to the
Indonesian Bankruptcy Code).
266. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (illustrating the ineffectiveness of the Indonesian
insolvency law under the 1998 amendments).
267. See No IndonesianCo. HasJoined Govt's Debt Settlement Program,supra note 206 (verifying not one
debtor has employed INDRA).
268. See supra note 261.
269. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (delineating the provisions of INDRA).
270. See iU
271. See No Indonesian Co. Has JoinedGovt's Debt Settlement Program,supra note 206 (noting the July
30, 1999, deadline will not be extended even if no one has yet to employ it); see also IndonesianDebtAgency Sets
Exchange Rate at Rp7,8161US$), supranote 206 (elucidating many debtors have expressed an interest in utilizing
INDRA). Perhaps with the value of the rupiah increasing and as inflation begins to come down, more debtors will
be interested in employing INDRA because they would be able to lock into a higher currency exchange rate then
would have been possible initially. See generally id.
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Consequently, INDRA has been substantially avoided and has merged into the
background. 2m
Unfortunately, Indonesia's economic problems are much more pervasive than
the wide-spread insolvency resulting from the Asian financial crisis." 3 Aside from
addressing the problem of insolvency, Indonesia needs to engage in significant
reformation of the operation ofits judiciary. 4 Additionally, Indonesia needs to take
appropriate steps to restore political stability and insure its continued existence in
the future.f 5

272. See generallysupranote 271 (proclaiming six months before the expiration of the registration date, not
one debtor has yet to employ INDRA). Additionally, little commentary on this topic was available as of the date
of this comment).
273. See generally supra notes 68, 211-14 (exploring the corruption of the judiciary and the political
instability of Indonesia).
274. See supranotes 68, 211-14 and accompanying text (demonstrating the impact of a corrupt judiciary).
275. See supranote 256 (asserting economic recovery directly relies on political stabilization).
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